1. The Petitioner is an employee of the 1st Respondent herein, a Constitutional Commission established under Article 246 of the Constitution of Kenya with the mandate to recruit and appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the National Police Service.
2. The 2nd Respondent is the Inspector General of the National Police Service established and appointed under article 245(1)(2) of the Constitution of Kenya and whose mandate is, inter alia, to exercise independent command over the National Police Service.
3. The 3rd Respondent is the Deputy Inspector General of Police appointed by the President under article 245(3) of the Constitution and who is mandated to head the Kenya Police Service.
The Petitioner’s case
4. The Petitioner instituted the present Petition dated 2nd February 2026 against the Respondents seeking the following reliefs: -
i. A declaration that the power to discipline officers in the national Police Service is domiciled in the office of the Inspector General of Police.
ii. A declaration that the procedure of removing an officer from the National Police Service must start with a recommendation by the Deputy Inspector General of the relevant service with a copy to the Inspector General of Police and the National Police Service Commission.
iii. A declaration that the National Police Service Commission cannot initiate the removal of a Police Officer from the service and that the involvement of the National Police Service Commission in the removal proceedings is only to sit on appeal preferred against decisions arising from such proceedings.
iv. A declaration that the National Police Service Commission acted ultra-vires its powers and functions by recommending the removal of the Petitioner from the service when such powers reside in the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Kenya Police.
v. A declaration that the National Police Service Commission's decision directing the Inspector General to remove the petitioner from the service is contrary to article 245(4c) in as far as it purported to direct the Inspector General in the performance of his work and execution of his authority.
vi. An order of Certiorari to bring into this court for the purposes of their being quashed the following decisions:
a) The decision contained in the 1st respondent's letter Ref. No. NPSC/SEC/1/8/1 VOL. VII (102) dated 13th June, 2024 in as far as it relates to the recommendation by the 1st Respondent for
the 2nd Respondent to remove the petitioner from the service.
b) The 3rd Respondent's letter Ref No, PF/233418/2003015818 dated 11th February 2026 referred to in the Rift Valley
Regional Police Commander’s letter Ref No. KPS/DIG/RVR/SEC/HRM15/VOL.II/145 also dated 11th February 2026 concurring with the 1st Respondent’s direction for the removal of the Petitioner from service.
c) The letter Ref No. KPS/DIG/RVR/SBU/HRM/14/VOL.III/155 authored by the Samburu County Police Commander suspending the petitioner from service following the 1st Respondent’s decision for his removal and the 3rd Respondent's concurrence.
vii. A declaration that the decision of the 1st Respondent to have the Petitioner removed from the service was made by in the exercise of non-existent powers and authority and against the constitution and statute law and is therefore null and void ab initio.
viii. Costs
5. The Petitioner is a superintendent of Police employed by the 1st Respondent, having joined the National Police Service on 3rd May 2003 and risen through the ranks to his current position following his promotion on 30th August 2022.
6. The Petitioner states that on 29th December 2025 he received a Notice to Show Cause dated 26th December 2025 from the Samburu County Police Commander informing him that the National Police Service Commission (the 1st Respondent) had recommended to the Inspector General that he be removed from the Service in the interest of the Service.
7. According to the Petitioner, the intended disciplinary action arose from criminal proceedings before the Kahawa Law Courts in Criminal Case No. E097 of 2022. In that case, he had been charged with offences relating to the alleged possession of 13.97 kilograms of cannabis, a G3 rifle, 203 rounds of ammunition and sandalwood valued at approximately Kshs.54,000,000, all of which were allegedly recovered from his residence while he was stationed at Wamba, Samburu County.
8. The Petitioner avers that after a full trial he was acquitted of all the charges. He states that the trial court found that the firearm, ammunition and cannabis were exhibits in police investigations which had been temporarily stored in his house in his official capacity pending transfer to the exhibit store, and further found that there was no evidence linking him to the alleged sandalwood trafficking.
9. The Petitioner contends that notwithstanding his acquittal, the 1st Respondent recommended his removal from service on the ground that storing exhibits in his residence amounted to conduct that set a bad precedent within the Service. He avers that he responded to the Notice to Show Cause on 2nd January 2026, explaining that the temporary storage of exhibits was permitted under the Service Standing Orders and was necessitated by operational circumstances and that it had already been considered and accepted by the criminal court during his trial.
10. The Petitioner alleges that the Respondents failed to consider his response and instead proceeded with internal correspondence implementing the Commission's recommendation, culminating in his suspension from service on 12th February 2026 pending removal from the Service.
11. The Petitioner further contends that the disciplinary process adopted by the Respondents is contrary to the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act and the Service Standing Orders. He asserts that the constitutional and statutory mandate to discipline members of the National Police Service rests with the Inspector General, while the role of the National Police Service Commission is confined to determining appeals arising from disciplinary proceedings.
12. It is the Petitioner’s case that under Section 56 of Chapter 30 of the Service Standing Orders, removal from service in the interest of the Service must be initiated by the relevant Deputy Inspector General, copied to the Inspector General and the Commission. In this regard, he avers that the Commission acted outside its constitutional and statutory mandate by initiating and directing his removal from service.
13. The Petitioner further states that by directing the Inspector General to commence removal proceedings, the Commission unlawfully directed the Inspector General in the exercise of his constitutional functions contrary to Article 245(4)(c) of the Constitution and usurped the powers reserved for the Deputy Inspector General.
14. It is also the Petitioner's case that because the Commission itself initiated the impugned process, he has been denied the statutory right of appeal to the Commission, thereby rendering the internal dispute resolution mechanism unavailable and ineffective.
15. Lastly, the Petitioner contends that subjecting him to disciplinary process on the same factual allegations for which he was acquitted in Criminal Case No. E097 of 2022 violates the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial, particularly Article 50(2)(o) of the Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void.
The 1st Respondents Response
16. The 1st Respondent avers that it is a constitutional commission established under Article 246 of the Constitution and is vested with the mandate to recruit, appoint, exercise disciplinary control over, and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the National Police Service. It further states that the National Police Service, established under Article 243 of the Constitution, is constitutionally required under Article 244 to uphold the highest standards of professionalism, discipline, transparency and accountability and is governed by the Constitution, the National Police Service Act and the Service Standing Orders.
17. The 1st Respondent avers that on 27th September 2022, the Petitioner was arrested and charged before the Senior Principal Magistrate's Court at Kahawa in Criminal Case No. E097 of 2022 in connection with the recovery of cannabis, firearms, ammunition and sandalwood allegedly found at his residence. It is the 1st Respondent’s case that although the Petitioner was subsequently acquitted under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the acquittal did not preclude it from instituting administrative and disciplinary proceedings arising from the same facts.
18. The 1st Respondent maintains that on 6th June 2024 it considered the circumstances surrounding the Petitioner's conduct and concluded that exhibits ought to be kept in designated exhibit stores rather than private residences, and that retaining such exhibits in a private residence set a dangerous and unacceptable precedent within the Service. It avers that it consequently recommended to the Inspector General that removal proceedings be commenced against the Petitioner in the interest of the Service.
19. The 1st Respondent asserts that the recommendation was subsequently acted upon by the County Police Headquarters, Samburu County, which concurred with the recommendation and suspended the Petitioner from service with effect from 12th February 2026 pursuant to Section 14(7) of Legal Notice No. 90 made under the National Police Service Commission Act.
20. The 1st Respondent contends that upon receiving reports and recommendations through the established administrative structures of the National Police Service, it properly exercised its constitutional and statutory mandate under Article 246(3) of the Constitution and Section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act by directing that removal proceedings against the Petitioner be initiated.
21. It is the 1st Respondent's position that the disciplinary proceedings were based solely on the Petitioner's professional conduct as a police officer and not on criminal liability. It maintains that disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings and are intended to determine whether an officer's conduct meets the standards of integrity, professionalism and suitability required for continued service.
22. The 1st Respondent further avers that the Petitioner admitted storing cannabis, firearms, ammunition and other exhibits within his residence. It contends that Chapter 33 Section 4(d) of the Force Standing Orders requires officers handling exhibits to deposit them in the exhibit store as soon as practicable and prohibits their retention in unauthorized locations beyond the period reasonably necessary for operational purposes. In its view, the storage of such exhibits in a private residence raises serious concerns relating to discipline, accountability, security, public confidence and adherence to established police procedures.
23. In response to the allegation by the Petitioner that it usurped the constitutional functions of either the Inspector General or the Deputy Inspector General, the 1st Respondent contended that it acted strictly within the constitutional framework established by Article 246 of the Constitution and Section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act. It further relied on Section 8A of the National Police Service Act, which requires that although the Inspector General exercises independent command over the Service, that command remains subject to the disciplinary control of the Commission. The 1st Respondent maintained that the Commission's disciplinary role is not merely appellate but includes the constitutional authority to exercise disciplinary control over members of the National Police Service and that the recommendations and communications challenged by the Petitioner formed part of lawful internal administrative and disciplinary processes contemplated under the Constitution, the National Police Service Act and the Service Standing Orders.
24. The 1st Respondent further maintains that the Petitioner was accorded procedural fairness, having been served with a Notice to Show Cause and afforded an opportunity to respond before any further action was taken. It therefore contends that the disciplinary process against the Petitioner complied with Article 47 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
25. In response to the Petitioner’s averment that he 1st Respondent also dispute the Petitioner's interpretation of its constitutional mandate,
26. The 1st Respondent denied violating any of the Petitioner's constitutional rights under Articles 27, 41, 47 or 50 of the Constitution. In particular, it contended that Article 50(2)(o), which protects against double jeopardy, applies exclusively to criminal proceedings and does not bar disciplinary proceedings founded on the same facts that gave rise to criminal charges.
27. The 1st Respondent averred that the disciplinary proceedings were intended to safeguard integrity, professionalism, accountability and public confidence within the National Police Service. It is contended that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Commission acted ultra vires its constitutional mandate or violated the Constitution.
28. Consequently, the Court was urged to decline granting the reliefs sought on the basis that judicial intervention would improperly interfere with lawful internal disciplinary mechanisms and undermine discipline within the National Police Service.
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents Response
29. From the record, it appears the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not file any response to the Petition.
Disposal of the Petition
30. Pursuant to the directions issued by the Court on 27th April 2026, the Petition was canvassed by way of written submissions. The petitioner filed two sets of submissions. The submissions dated 6th March2026 and the further submissions dated 8th June 2026.The 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s submissions are dated 16th June 2026.
The Petitioner’s submissions
31. It his submissions dated 6th march 2026, the petitioner framed the issues for determination to be: -
i. Is the purported removal of the petitioner from service fair or justified considering the circumstances of this case?
ii. Who between the Inspector General of Police and the National Police Service Commission exercises direct disciplinary authority over police officers
iii. To what extent does the National Police Service Commission exercise
disciplinary authority within the service?
iv. What remedies should the court issue in this case?
32. On the first issue, the Petitioner submits that the intended removal from service was both procedurally and substantively unfair. He contends that the National Police Service Commission usurped the constitutional powers of the Inspector General by directing his removal from office before the prescribed disciplinary process had been undertaken. It is further submitted that the Commission acted outside its constitutional and statutory mandate, rendering the intended removal unlawful and unjustified.
33. The Petitioner submits that the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Service Standing Orders and the National Police Service Commission (Discipline) Regulations, 2015 l set out the powers and procedure for removal of a police officer from service. Relying on Article 245(4)(c) of the Constitution, the Petitioner submitted that dismissal of police officers falls exclusively within the Inspector General's constitutionally protected operational independence. In support of this position, the Petitioner cited the case of Mwau v Inspector General, National Police Service & 3 Others; National Security Council & Another (Interested Parties) [2025] KEELRC 2951 (KLR).
34. The Petitioner further submits that by directing the Inspector General to commence his removal process, the 1st Respondent violated Article 245(4)(c) of the Constitution and unlawfully usurped powers reserved to the Inspector General. The Petitioner relied in the cases of Attorney General & 2 Others v Ndii & 79 Others; Dixon & 7 Others (Amicus Curiae) [2022] KESC 8 (KLR), Republic v Inspector General of Police ex parte Akitch Okola [2014] eKLR and Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 Others [2019] eKLR for the proposition that public bodies must act strictly within powers conferred by law and that any exercise of powers beyond the statutory mandate is ultra vires and void.
35. The Petitioner further submits that Sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act reinforce the constitutional position by placing command and discipline of the Service under the independent authority of the Inspector General.
36. It is submitted that Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution and Section 10(4) of the National Police Service Commission Act merely confer disciplinary control upon the Commission, which is limited to developing disciplinary procedures, monitoring compliance, reviewing and ratifying disciplinary decisions taken by the Inspector General and determining disciplinary appeals. According to the Petitioner, the Commission therefore exercises oversight rather than direct disciplinary authority.
37. Further, the Petitioner submitted that Rule 3 of the National Police Service Commission (Discipline) Regulations, 2015 similarly grants the Commission powers to develop fair disciplinary mechanisms, ensure compliance with due process and hear disciplinary appeals. In this regard, the Petitioner submits that disciplinary actions against police officers is a reserve of the Inspector General and maintains that the Commission cannot initiate disciplinary proceedings against police officers without undermining its own appellate function.
38. The Petitioner also relied on Chapter 30 of the National Police Service Standing Orders, particularly Sections 52 and 56, which provide that removal of an officer in the public interest or in the interest of the Service should originate from the relevant Deputy Inspector General or Director of Criminal Investigations before being transmitted through the prescribed hierarchy to the Commission. It is submitted that the disciplinary process must proceed from the lower levels of command upwards so as to preserve the officer's statutory right of appeal. According to the Petitioner, by originating the removal process itself, the Commission effectively denied him the opportunity to challenge the decision through the internal appellate framework.
39. The Petitioner further contends that although the 1st Respondent maintains that due process was observed, no evidence was placed before the Court demonstrating compliance with the elaborate disciplinary procedures prescribed under the Standing Orders and the National Police Service Commission (Discipline) Regulations. He therefore maintains that the impugned process violated Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act. In support of this position, reliance was placed in the cases of Maigacho v Coast Development Authority [2023] KECA 1316 (KLR), Manyonyi v African Medical and Research Foundation [2026] KECA 101 (KLR), and Anne Wambui Kamuiru v Kenya Airways [2016] eKLR
40. On whether the reasons for the intended removal of the Petitioner from service was justified, Petitioner submitted that the reason given for his removal from service is that he set a bad precedent by keeping exhibits in his house. This allegation, he argues is contrary to Chapter 33 Section 4(d) of the Service Standing Orders, which recognizes that whereas the exhibits should ideally be kept in the exhibit store, the law appreciates that this may not be practicable in all circumstances.
41. The Petitioner submits that he arrived at the station with the exhibits late at night after collecting them from Archers Post Police Station and that access to the exhibit store required the simultaneous presence of two officers holding separate keys, but one of the officers could not be reached that night while the other became unavailable the following day after being deployed on an operation. He contends that the exhibits remained in his residence for slightly over twenty-four hours until the exhibit store became accessible. In this regard, the Petitioner maintains that these circumstances demonstrated compliance with the Standing Orders and that his actions were reasonable, lawful and taken in the interest of the Service. The Petitioner further submits that the criminal court accepted this explanation when acquitting him and that the Respondents did not controvert those factual circumstances.
42. On the second issue, the Petitioner reiterated that Articles 245(2)(b) and 245(4)(c) of the Constitution, together with Sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act, confer exclusive authority over command and discipline upon the Inspector General. According to the Petitioner, matters relating to the handling of police exhibits are operational issues falling within the Inspector General's command structure and should, where necessary, be investigated through the Internal Affairs Unit established under Sections 87 and 89 of the National Police Service Act, whose recommendations are ultimately made to the Inspector General.
43. The Petitioner further submitted that the Commission's role under Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution is confined to exercising disciplinary control, which, properly construed under Section 10(4) of the National Police Service Commission Act, entails policy formulation, monitoring compliance with due process, reviewing and ratifying disciplinary decisions taken by the Inspector General, and determining disciplinary appeals. The Petitioner maintained that the 1st Respondent cannot lawfully originate disciplinary proceedings because doing so compromises its statutory role as the appellate body. The Petitioner further contends that Section 52(1)(e) of Chapter 30 of the Service Standing Orders expressly requires removal proceedings to originate from the relevant Deputy Inspector General or the Director of Criminal Investigations before being referred to the Commission.
44. In the end, the Petitioner disputed the Respondents' assertion that the Deputy Inspector General and the County Police Commander concurred with the Commission's decision. He submits that the disciplinary framework contemplates the Commission reviewing decisions originating from subordinate disciplinary organs rather than the reverse. The Petitioner further contends that no evidence was produced to demonstrate such concurrence and instead points to confidential correspondence allegedly authored by the County Police Commander indicating that he had no adverse report against the Petitioner.
45. The Petitioner therefore urged the Court to allow the Petition and grant the reliefs sought.
46. By and large, the Petitioner’s further submissions reiterated the above submissions.
The 1st Respondent's Submissions
47. In its submissions dated 3rd June 2026, the 1st Respondent identified the following issues for determination:-
i. Whether the National Police Service Commission acted within its constitutional mandate
ii. Whether disciplinary proceedings may arise from facts that also formed the basis of criminal proceedings
iii. Whether the Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated
iv. Whether the Petition against the 1st Respondent is misconceived and devoid of merit
v. Whether the Petition is premature
vi. Whether the remedies sought are available.
48. On the first issue, the 1st Respondent, while relying on Articles 245 and 246(3)(b) of the Constitution, as well as section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act, submitted that the Constitution expressly vests disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in offices within the National Police Service in the National Police Service Commission, while the Inspector-General exercises command and operational control over the Service. It was therefore contended that these constitutional mandates are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
49. The 1st Respondent further submitted that Article 245 of the Constitution, read together with sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act, vests command, administration and day-to-day disciplinary management of the Service in the Inspector-General. That Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution confers disciplinary control over members of the Service upon the Commission. It was argued that these constitutional provisions must be read harmoniously, with each institution exercising its respective mandate within the constitutional framework.
50. The 1st Respondent submitted that the Petitioner's contention that the Commission usurped the mandate of the Inspector-General and the Deputy Inspector-General is erroneous, as it disregards the constitutional architecture governing discipline within the National Police Service, which envisages complementary, rather than competing, roles for the two institutions. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the decision in Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board v Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association, Petition No. 29 of 2014 [2014] KESC 4 (KLR), where the Supreme Court emphasized that courts should accord deference to constitutional bodies acting within their constitutional mandate and should refrain from interfering unless clear illegality or constitutional violations are demonstrated.
51. The 1st Respondent also relied on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR and State v Makwanyane & Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3.
52. The 1st Respondent further submitted that the impugned recommendation neither amounted to an assumption of operational command nor constituted a binding direction to the Inspector-General. Rather, it represented the Commission's exercise of its constitutional disciplinary oversight mandate under Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution. It was contended that the implementation of any disciplinary action remained subject to the established command structure within the National Police Service.
53. On the second issue, the 1st Respondent submitted that the Petitioner's contention that his acquittal in Criminal Case No. E097 of 2022 barred the Respondents from instituting disciplinary proceedings founded on the same facts is misconceived. It was submitted that criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are distinct processes, each serving different objectives and governed by different standards of proof. The 1st Respondent submitted that an acquittal in criminal proceedings does not preclude an employer from instituting disciplinary proceedings arising from the same facts. The 1st Respondent therefore submitted that the doctrine of double jeopardy under Article 50(2)(o) of the Constitution is inapplicable as the impugned proceedings were administrative rather than criminal in nature.
54. The 1st Respondent submitted that whereas criminal proceedings seek to establish criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt, disciplinary proceedings are intended to uphold the constitutional values of integrity, professionalism, accountability, discipline and suitability for continued public service, as envisaged under Articles 73 and 232 of the Constitution.
55. The 1st Respondent, submitted that the Commission's concern was not whether the Petitioner had committed a criminal offence, but whether his conduct satisfied the standards expected of a senior police officer entrusted with public authority and the custody of sensitive exhibits. In support of this position, reliance was placed on Geoffrey Kiragu Njogu v Public Service Commission, Civil Appeal No. 57 of 2014. The 1st Respondent further relied on Attorney General & Another v Andrew Maina Githinji, Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2015 [2016] KECA 817 (KLR) and Kenya Revenue Authority v Menginya Salim Murgani [2010] eKLR,
56. The 1st Respondent further submitted that members of the National Police Service bear the solemn responsibility of maintaining law and order and are therefore required to uphold the highest standards of professionalism, accountability, discipline and integrity. These values, it was argued, are fundamental to maintaining public confidence in the Service and ensuring the effective discharge of its constitutional and statutory mandate.
57. It was submitted that Chapter 33, section 4(d) of the Force Standing Orders requires police officers handling exhibits to deposit them in designated exhibit stores and expressly prohibits their unauthorized retention.
58. It is the 1st Respondent’s submissions that the Petitioner admitted retaining exhibits, including firearms, ammunition and cannabis, at his residential premises.
59. The 1st Respondent submitted that the Commission was entitled to inquire whether the Petitioner's conduct met the standards expected of a police officer. It maintained that the disciplinary proceedings were not only lawful but also necessary to safeguard the integrity, discipline and public confidence in the National Police Service.
60. On whether the Petitioner was accorded fair administrative action and whether his Constitutional rights were violated, the 1st Respondent submitted that the Petitioner was accorded a fair administrative process and none of his constitutional rights was violated. It is submitted that the Petitioner was duly notified of the allegations levelled against him, served with a Notice to Show Cause and afforded an opportunity to respond. That he subsequently filed a written response, which was duly considered by the Commission before any further action was taken. The 1st Respondent thus maintained that the requirements of procedural fairness and fair administrative action were fully complied with
61. In addition, the 1st Respondent citing the decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154, as reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others, Civil Appeal No. 290 of 2012 [2013] eKLR submitted that the Petitioner had failed to establish any procedural irregularity capable of vitiating the disciplinary process. The1st Respondent asserted that the Petitioner's own pleadings acknowledged that firearms, ammunition and narcotic exhibits were recovered from his residence, facts which formed the basis of the disciplinary proceedings.
62. While submitting that police officers are entrusted with the custody of sensitive exhibits and are expected to uphold the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and accountability in order to maintain public confidence in law enforcement, the 1st Respondent contended that the Commission was entitled to conclude that the Petitioner's conduct raised legitimate concerns regarding discipline, professionalism and public confidence in the National Police Service.
63. On the issue whether the Petition against the 1st Respondent is meritless and misconceived, it is submitted that the Petition is an abuse of the court process as it was instituted in bad faith. Reliance was placed on the decision in Fremar Construction Co. Ltd v Minakshi Navin Shah, Civil Appeal No. 85 of 2002 and Trust Bank Limited v Amin Company Ltd & Another [2000] KLR 164,
64. On whether the Petition is Premature, the 1st Respondent submitted that the Petition is improperly before this Court because the Petitioner failed to exhaust the dispute resolution mechanisms established under the Constitution, the National Police Service Commission Act and the disciplinary framework governing members of the National Police Service.
65. The 1st Respondent submitted that, at the time of filing the Petition, the disciplinary process against the Petitioner was still ongoing. The 1st Respondent averred that the Petitioner had been served with a Notice to Show Cause and subsequently suspended pending the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. It is submitted that no final decision removing the Petitioner from office had been made when the Petition was instituted and that the impugned suspension was merely an interim administrative measure pending the conclusion of the disciplinary process.
66. The 1st Respondent contended that the Petitioner approached the Court before the disciplinary process had run its full course and before any final administrative decision capable of being challenged by way of appeal or judicial review had crystallized.
67. It was further contended that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of any exceptional circumstances warranting exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion. In particular, the 1st Respondent submitted that the Petitioner had not shown that the available disciplinary mechanisms were ineffective, unavailable, biased, or otherwise incapable of affording an appropriate remedy.
68. The 1st Respondent submitted that the Petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion, was filed prematurely before the disciplinary process had been concluded and constitutes an attempt to circumvent the statutory framework governing discipline within the National Police Service. On this basis, the Court was urged to decline the invitation to interfere with the ongoing disciplinary proceedings and to find that the Petition is premature, incompetent and liable to dismissal.
69. Lastly, with regard to the reliefs sought, the 1st Respondent in response to the first prayer submitted that the disciplinary mandate of the National Police Service Commission is expressly provided for under Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution and section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act, while Article 245 of the Constitution and sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act vest command and operational discipline in the Inspector-General. It was argued that the two constitutional mandates are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and that the Petitioner's contention that disciplinary authority resides exclusively in the Inspector-General is legally untenable.
70. With regard to the second and third prayers, the 1st Respondent submitted that the National Police Service Standing Orders do not require removal proceedings to originate exclusively from the Deputy Inspector-General and that the Commission's role is not limited to hearing disciplinary appeals. It was submitted that the Commission is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to exercise disciplinary control, monitor compliance with disciplinary procedures, review and ratify disciplinary decisions, and hear disciplinary appeals.
71. Regarding the fourth and fifth prayers, the 1st Respondent submitted that its recommendation for the Petitioner's removal did not amount to a dismissal or an unlawful direction to the Inspector-General. It was argued that the recommendation formed part of the disciplinary process contemplated under the Constitution and statute, and that the Inspector-General and other commanders independently exercised their respective constitutional mandates.
72. As regards the prayers for orders of certiorari, the 1st Respondent submitted that the impugned decisions were neither illegal, irrational nor procedurally improper. It maintained that the Commission acted within its constitutional mandate, the Deputy Inspector-General lawfully participated in the disciplinary process, and the Petitioner's suspension constituted an interim administrative measure undertaken after he had been accorded procedural fairness through the issuance of a Notice to Show Cause and an opportunity to respond. Accordingly, it was urged that the Court should not interfere with an ongoing disciplinary process in the absence of any demonstrated illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.
73. On costs, the 1st Respondent submitted that, having acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate and having been compelled to defend an unmeritorious Petition, it is entitled to costs.
74. In the end, the 1st Respondent maintained that the disciplinary proceedings were lawful, procedurally fair and distinct from the criminal proceedings in which the Petitioner was acquitted. It is submitted that the Petitioner had failed to establish any violation of Articles 41, 47 or 50(2)(o) of the Constitution or any exceptional circumstances warranting judicial intervention.
75. Accordingly, the 1st Respondent urged the Court to uphold the constitutional mandate of the National Police Service Commission, decline to interfere with the ongoing disciplinary process and dismiss the instant Petition with costs.
The 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s submissions
76. In their submissions, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents framed the following issues for determination: -
i. Whether the petition discloses any violation of the Constitution
ii. Whether the Commission usurped the powers of the Inspector General
iii. Whether the Commission's recommendation amounted to an unlawful direction
iv. Whether the Petition is premature
v. Whether the remedies sought are available
77. On the first three issues, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the Petition does not disclose any violation of the Constitution or of the Petitioner's constitutional rights. They argued that, at the time the Petition was filed, the Petitioner had not been removed from the National Police Service but had merely been served with a Notice to Show Cause and suspended from duty pending the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the disciplinary process had not crystallized into a final decision capable of giving rise to a constitutional grievance.
78. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the Petitioner's contention that the National Police Service Commission usurped the disciplinary powers of the Inspector General was founded on an erroneous interpretation of the constitutional and statutory framework governing the National Police Service. They argued that Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution establish complementary, rather than competing, institutions whose respective mandates must be interpreted harmoniously. In this regard, reliance was placed on Dande & 4 Others v Inspector General, National Police Service & 2 Others [2022] KECA 170 (KLR)
79. It was further submitted that whereas Article 245 safeguards the operational independence of the Inspector General, Article 246(3)(b) expressly confers upon the Commission the constitutional mandate to exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the National Police Service. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued that Section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act operationalises that constitutional mandate and that the Commission therefore acted within its lawful authority.
80. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents contended that the Commission merely recommended that the Inspector General initiate removal proceedings against the Petitioner and did not direct or compel the Inspector General to remove him from office. According to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, a recommendation is not synonymous with a command and does not divest the Inspector General of his constitutional discretion. The Inspector General remained at liberty to independently consider the recommendation and determine the appropriate course of action. They therefore submitted that the Commission neither usurped the Inspector General's powers nor violated Article 245(4)(c) of the Constitution.
81. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents further submitted that while disciplinary authority is exercised through the Inspector General, the Commission is constitutionally obligated to ensure that appropriate disciplinary mechanisms are triggered where allegations disclose misconduct warranting disciplinary action. They argued that a recommendation requiring the Inspector General to commence disciplinary proceedings merely initiates the disciplinary process contemplated under the Constitution and applicable regulations and does not itself amount to removal from service. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the disciplinary process includes service of charges, a hearing, consideration of evidence, findings and a final determination, during which the affected officer enjoys the right to be heard and to pursue any available remedies.
82. On the issue whether the Petition was premature, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that no final administrative decision had been made by the time the Petition was filed. They argued that the Petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the Notice to Show Cause and that the Inspector General had not yet considered the response or reached any determination regarding his removal from service. It is therefore the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s submission that the alleged constitutional violations were speculative and anticipatory.
83. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents further submitted that courts ought not to interfere with ongoing administrative or disciplinary processes except in exceptional circumstances where the process is shown to be illegal, irrational or procedurally unfair. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the decisions in Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [2008] eKLR, Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, International Centre for Policy and Conflict & 5 Others v Attorney General & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, John Harun Mwau & 3 Others v Attorney General & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, Republic v National Environment Management Authority ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2011] eKLR, Judicial Service Commission v Gladys Boss Shollei & Another [2014] eKLR and Mutanga Tea & Coffee Company Ltd v Shikara Limited & Another [2015] eKLR
84. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent further submitted that the Commission's recommendation was merely advisory and initiatory in nature, did not itself produce adverse legal consequences and could not therefore constitute a violation of the Petitioner's constitutional rights. They maintained that no exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated to justify the Court's intervention before completion of the disciplinary process.
85. With regard to the last issue on the remedies sought by the Petitioner, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating with precision the constitutional provisions allegedly violated and the manner of their violation. They argued that the Petitioner had not demonstrated that the Inspector General surrendered his constitutional authority, that the Commission's recommendation amounted to an unconstitutional direction, that his acquittal in the criminal proceedings deprived the Service of disciplinary jurisdiction, or that the impugned suspension violated any constitutional right.
86. In the end, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted that the Petition merely sought to transform an institutional disagreement regarding the respective mandates of the Commission and the Inspector General into a constitutional dispute where none existed.
87. They urged the Court to find that the Commission lawfully exercised its constitutional mandate, that the Petition was premature and offended the doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness.
88. The court was thus urged to dismiss the Petition with costs.
Determination
89. Having carefully considered the Petition, the Response thereto, and the parties' written submissions, I am of the considered view that the following issues fall for determination: -
i. Whether the 1st Respondent acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate in recommending the Petitioner's removal from the National Police Service.
ii. Whether the disciplinary process initiated against the Petitioner violated the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Service Standing Orders and the Petitioner's constitutional rights.
iii. Whether the Petition is premature for failure to exhaust the disciplinary mechanism established under the Constitution and statute.
iv. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
Whether the 1st Respondent acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate in recommending the Petitioner's removal from the National Police Service.
90. The Petitioner’s main grievance is that the 1st Respondent acted outside its constitutional and statutory mandate by recommending his removal from the National Police Service. He contends that disciplinary authority over police officers vests exclusively in the Inspector General, while the 1st Respondent’s role is limited to exercising disciplinary control through oversight, review, ratification of disciplinary decisions and determination of appeals.
91. On the other hand, the Respondents assert that Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution empowers the 1st Respondent to exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the National Police Service. It is contended that the 1st Respondent’s recommendation merely initiates the disciplinary process and does not, in itself, constitute or determine the disciplinary outcome.
92. The starting point is the Constitution itself. Article 245(2)(b) provides: -
2. The Inspector General
(b) shall exercise independent command over the National Police Service and perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.
93. On the other hand, Article 246 on the other hand establishes the National Police Service Commission and Article 246(3) states as follows:
(3) The Commission shall—
a) recruit and appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the service, confirm appointments, and determine promotions and transfers within the National Police Service;
b) observing due process, exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the Service; and
c) perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.
94. The National Police Service Commission Act No 30 of 2011 at section 10(1) lists the function of the National Police Service Commission as follows:
(1)In addition to the functions of the Commission under article 246(3) of the Constitution, the Commission shall—
(a)keep under review all matters relating to standards or qualifications required of members of the Service;
(b)with the advice of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, determine the appropriate remuneration and benefits for the Service and staff of the Commission;
(c)approve applications for engagement by police officers in trade and other businesses, in accordance with the law relating to matters of leadership and integrity under article 80 of the Constitution;
(d)co-operate with other State agencies, departments or commissions on any matter that the Commission considers necessary;
(e)provide for the terms and conditions of service and the procedure for recruitment and disciplinary measures for civilian members of the Service;
(f)develop fair and clear disciplinary procedures in accordance with article 47 of the Constitution;
(g)investigate and summon witnesses to assist for the purposes of its investigations;
(h)exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in office in the Service;
(i)promote the values and principles referred to in Articles 10 and 232 of the Constitution throughout the Service;
(j)ensure that the Service is efficient and effective;
(k)hear and determine appeals from members of the Service;
(l)develop policies and provide oversight over training in the Service;
(m)approve training curricula and oversee their implementation;
(n)investigate, monitor and evaluate the organization, administration and personnel practices of the Service;
(o)receive and refer civilian complaints to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Ethics and Anticorruption Commission, as the case may be, where necessary;
(p)review and make recommendations to the national government in respect of conditions of service, code of conduct and qualifications of officers in the Service;
(q)evaluate and report to the President and the National Assembly on the extent to which the values and principles referred to in articles 10 and 232 are complied with in the Service;
(r)monitor and evaluate the performance of the Service;
(s)receive complaints and recommendations from police associations registered in accordance with the applicable law;
(t)perform such other functions as are provided for by the Constitution, this Act or any written law.
95. From a reading of the above constitutional and statutory provisions, it is clear that the Constitution assigns different, but related, roles to the Inspector General and the National Police Service Commission in matters of discipline. While Article 245 gives the Inspector General independent command of the National Police Service, Article 246 gives the Commission the mandate to exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons serving in the National Police Service. These provisions should therefore be read together and not in isolation.
96. In my view, the Petitioner's argument that the 1st Respondent’s role is limited to developing disciplinary policies, reviewing disciplinary decisions and hearing appeals is not supported by the wording of Article 246(3)(b) of the Constitution. The Constitution expressly gives the 1st Respondent power to exercise disciplinary control over and remove, persons serving in the National Police Service. Section 10 of the National Police Service Commission Act further explains how that mandate is to be carried out.
97. While Article 245 is categorical that the Inspector General should act independently in matters relating to the employment, promotion, suspension or dismissal of police officers, it does not exclude the Commission from playing its constitutional role in disciplinary matters. The Commission is therefore entitled to exercise disciplinary control, provided that it does not take over the Inspector General's constitutional mandate or issue directions prohibited under Article 245(4)(c).
98. The issue therefore is whether, in this case, the 1st Respondent merely exercised its constitutional mandate by recommending that removal proceedings be commenced against the Petitioner or whether it unlawfully directed the Inspector General to remove him from service.
99. The Petitioner argues that by recommending his removal from service, the 1st Respondent effectively directed the Inspector General to dismiss him, contrary to Article 245(4)(c) of the Constitution. However, the Respondents have maintained that the 1st Respondent merely made a recommendation requiring the Inspector General to initiate the removal process and that the final decision remained with the Inspector General.
100. I have carefully considered the contents of the impugned letter dated 13th June 2024. The relevant part reads: -
“It is further recommended that the Inspector General to initiate the removal process of the officer in the interest of the service.”
101. A plain reading of the impugned letter demonstrates that it did not purport to dismiss the Petitioner or to usurp the Inspector General's constitutional powers of command over the National Police Service. Rather, it merely recommended that the Inspector General initiate the Petitioner's removal process in the interest of the service.
102. In my considered view, there is a clear distinction between making a recommendation and issuing a binding direction. A recommendation leaves room for the recipient to consider the matter and make an independent decision. A direction, on the other hand, leaves no discretion and requires compliance. The communication did not itself dismiss the Petitioner, nor did it purport to exercise the Inspector General's disciplinary powers.
103. Further, there is no evidence before the Court that the Inspector General regarded himself as bound by the recommendation or abdicated his constitutional mandate by acting under the dictates of the 1st Respondent. The recommendation cannot therefore be construed as an unconstitutional usurpation of the Inspector General's disciplinary authority.
104. Accordingly, this Court finds that the 1st Respondent did not act outside its constitutional and statutory mandate merely by recommending that removal proceedings be initiated against the Petitioner.
Whether the disciplinary process initiated against the Petitioner violated the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Service Standing Orders and the Petitioner's constitutional rights.
105. The Petitioner contends that the disciplinary process was unlawful both procedurally and substantively. According to him, the decision to remove him had already been made before he was served with the Notice to Show Cause, rendering the disciplinary process a mere formality. He further argues that the Respondents failed to comply with the procedure prescribed under the Service Standing Orders and thereby violated his rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution.
106. On their part, the Respondents maintain that the Petitioner was issued with a Notice to Show Cause, afforded an opportunity to respond and that the disciplinary process was still ongoing when this Petition was filed.
107. The record shows that by its letter dated 13th June 2024, the Commission recommended that the Inspector General initiate the Petitioner's removal from service in the interest of the Service. The Petitioner was later served with a Notice to Show Cause dated 26th December 2025 requiring him to explain why he should not be removed from service. The Petitioner responded to the Notice on 2nd January 2026, after which he was suspended pending the outcome of the disciplinary process.
108. The Petitioner's main complaint is that the Notice to Show Cause was issued after the Commission had already decided that he should be removed from service. According to him, the disciplinary process was therefore predetermined and his response could not have influenced the outcome.
109. I have carefully considered this argument. The Commission's recommendation of 13th June 2024 did not itself remove the Petitioner from service. Rather, it recommended that the Inspector General initiate the removal process. The Notice to Show Cause was thereafter issued, the Petitioner responded to it and, as at the time this Petition was filed, no final decision removing him from service had been made. The disciplinary process was therefore still underway.
110. The mere fact that the Commission had recommended the commencement of removal proceedings does not establish that the disciplinary process was predetermined. For the Court to reach such a conclusion, there must be evidence showing that the officer responsible for determining the disciplinary proceedings had already closed his mind to the Petitioner's response or that the outcome had been decided irrespective of whatever explanation the Petitioner might offer.
111. No such evidence has been placed before this Court. Apart from the chronology of events, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that his response to the Notice to Show Cause was ignored, that the Inspector General had already reached a final decision before considering his response, or that the disciplinary process had been concluded by the time this Petition was instituted.
112. The Petitioner also argued that the procedure prescribed under the Service Standing Orders was not followed. However, beyond making that assertion, no evidence has been placed before the Court demonstrating which mandatory procedural step was omitted or violated during the disciplinary process that had commenced.
113. On the contrary, the record shows that the Petitioner was informed of the allegations against him, served with a Notice to Show Cause and afforded an opportunity to respond before any final decision was made. These are fundamental requirements of procedural fairness under Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act.
114. In addition, I am not persuaded that the Petitioner's right of appeal had already been defeated merely because the Commission recommended commencement of the disciplinary process. At the time this Petition was filed, no final disciplinary decision had been rendered. The apprehension that the Petitioner would eventually be denied an appeal remained speculative, as the disciplinary process had not reached its conclusion.
115. The Petitioner further contends that since he had been acquitted in Criminal Case No. E097 of 2022, the Respondents could not lawfully institute disciplinary proceedings founded on the same facts. I do not agree. Criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings serve different purposes and are governed by different standards of proof. An acquittal in criminal proceedings does not bar an employer from instituting disciplinary proceedings arising from the same facts, provided that the disciplinary process complies with the law and principles of fairness. Accordingly, Article 50(2)(o) of the Constitution, which protects an accused person from being tried twice for the same criminal offence, does not prohibit disciplinary proceedings based on the same facts.
116. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Petitioner has demonstrated that the disciplinary process initiated against him violated the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Service Standing Orders or his constitutional rights.
117. The process had not been concluded, and no final disciplinary decision had been made.
Whether the Petition is premature for failure to exhaust the disciplinary mechanism established under the Constitution and statute
118. The Respondents submitted that the Petition was prematurely instituted because, at the time it was filed, the disciplinary process had not been concluded. They argued that the Petitioner had merely been served with a Notice to Show Cause, had responded to it and the Inspector General had not made a final determination regarding his removal from service.
119. They therefore contended that the Petitioner ought to have allowed the disciplinary process to run its course before invoking this Court's jurisdiction.
120. It is now settled that where the Constitution or statute establishes an internal dispute resolution mechanism, a party should, as a general rule, exhaust that mechanism before approaching the Court. The rationale for the doctrine is to allow statutory bodies to exercise the powers entrusted to them by law and to resolve disputes falling within their mandate before the Court is invited to intervene. This principle was firmly established in Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] KLR 21, where the Court held that: -
“15. In our view, there is considerable merit in the submission that where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed. We observe without expressing a concluded view that order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules cannot oust clear constitutional and statutory provisions.”
121. However, the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute. Courts have consistently held that they may intervene where exceptional circumstances exist, including where the impugned process is alleged to be unconstitutional, where the decision-maker acts without jurisdiction, where the internal mechanism is inadequate or ineffective, or where pursuing it would be futile.
122. In the case of Ramogi & 3 others v Attorney General & 4 others; Muslims for Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KEHC 10266 (KLR), a five-judge bench held as follows:-
“59. However, our case law has developed a number of exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion. In R. vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (I.E.B.C.) & Others Ex Parte The National Super Alliance Kenya (NASA) (supra), after exhaustively reviewing Kenya's decisional law on the exhaustion doctrine, the High Court described the first exception thus: What emerges from our jurisprudence in these cases are at least two principles: while, exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are not clearly delineated, Courts must undertake an extensive analysis of the facts, regulatory scheme involved, the nature of the interests involved – including level of public interest involved and the polycentricity of the issue (and hence the ability of a statutory forum to balance them) to determine whether an exception applies. As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in the Shikara Limited Case (supra), the High Court may, in exceptional circumstances, find that exhaustion requirement would not serve the values enshrined in the Constitution or law and permit the suit to proceed before it. This exception to the exhaustion requirement is particularly likely where a party pleads issues that verge on Constitutional interpretation especially in virgin areas or where an important constitutional value is at stake. See also Moffat Kamau and 9 Others vs Aelous (K) Ltd and 9 Others.)
60.As observed above, the first principle is that the High Court may, in exceptional circumstances consider, and determine that the exhaustion requirement would not serve the values enshrined in the Constitution or law and allow the suit to proceed before it. It is also essential for the Court to consider the suitability of the appeal mechanism available in the context of the particular case and determine whether it is suitable to determine the issues raised.
61.The second principle is that the jurisdiction of the Courts to consider valid grievances from parties who lack adequate audience before a forum created by a statute, or who may not have the quality of audience before the forum which is proportionate to the interests the party wishes to advance in a suit must not be ousted. The rationale behind this precept is that statutory provisions ousting Court’s jurisdiction must be construed restrictively. This was extensively elaborated by Mativo J in Night Rose Cosmetics (1972) Ltd v Nairobi County Government & 2 others [2018] eKLR.
62.In the instant case, the Petitioners allege violation of their fundamental rights. Where a suit primarily seeks to enforce fundamental rights and freedoms and it is demonstrated that the claimed constitutional violations are not mere “bootstraps” or merely framed in Bill of Rights language as a pretext to gain entry to the Court, it is not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. This is especially so because the enforcement of fundamental rights or freedoms is a question which can only be determined by the High Court.”
123. In the present case, the Petitioner is not merely challenging the merits of the disciplinary proceedings. His complaint goes to the legality of the process itself. He contends that the 1st Respondent acted outside its constitutional mandate and that the disciplinary process was initiated by the wrong authority. He also avers that the procedure adopted violated the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act and the Service Standing Orders. In my view, these are questions that fall squarely within the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
124. Although the Petitioner's argument that the Commission unlawfully initiated the disciplinary process has not succeeded, the Court is not persuaded that this Petition is barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. The Petition raises substantial constitutional and statutory questions regarding the respective mandates of the Commission and the Inspector General, as well as the legality of the disciplinary process. Those are matters that properly fall within the jurisdiction of this Court
125. Accordingly, I find that the Petition was not premature and that this Court was properly seized of jurisdiction to determine the constitutional and statutory issues raised therein.
Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
126. Having found that the 1st Respondent acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate in recommending the Petitioner's removal from the National Police Service; that the disciplinary process did not violate the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Service Standing Orders or the Petitioner's constitutional rights; and that the Petition was properly before this Court, it follows that the Petitioner has failed to establish a basis for the grant of the declaratory and judicial review orders sought.
127. Consequently, the prayers seeking declarations that the Commission acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate, that it unlawfully directed the Inspector General to remove the Petitioner from service, and that the impugned decisions are unconstitutional, null and void are declined. Also, the prayer for an order of certiorari to quash the impugned decisions is not merited.
128. In the upshot, the Petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
129. As this is a dispute arising from an employment relationship and raising important constitutional questions relating to the respective mandates of the National Police Service Commission and the Inspector General, I direct that each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ON
THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2026