1. On 18th August 2026, I dismissed the application herein and directed that I would render a detailed ruling on 25th August 2026. I now do so.
2. The Notice of Motion dated 28th July 2026 is presented under Articles 2, 10, 19, 22, 23, 29(d), 47, 165(3), 227, 232, 258 of the Constitution as well as the Supervisory Jurisdiction Rules and the Constitution of Kenya ( Supervisory Jurisdiction and Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) High Court Practice and Procedure Rules, along with the Civil Procedure Act. The Applicant seeks conservatory relief aimed at halting what he describes as an unlawful and constitutionally offensive recruitment process undertaken by the Respondents. The Motion is anchored on the assertion that the Respondents’ actions threaten constitutional values of transparency, fairness, and lawful administrative conduct in public appointments.
3. On 28th July 2026, this Court granted orders restraining the Respondents from interviewing applicants, processing applications, or issuing employment contracts with regard to vacancies published on 4th June 2026. In the current application the substantive prayer is that the Court vary and expand the temporary injunction issued on 28th July 2026 so that it halts any recruitment advertised by the respondent. The essence of the Motion is therefore the enlargement of the existing injunction to stop the entire recruitment exercise pending determination of the petition.
4. The applicant avers that he has since discovered additional advertisements for other positions not covered by the order of 28th July 2026. He contends that the Respondents are likely to proceed with recruitment under these other advertisements, thereby undermining the efficacy of the Court’s earlier injunction. This discovery forms the core justification for seeking an expanded injunction.
5. The Applicant argues that unless the injunction is broadened, the Respondents may continue processing applications and issuing contracts under the uncovered advertisements, which would defeat the purpose of the petition and render the Court’s earlier orders ineffective. He asserts that the balance of convenience favours extending the injunction, as doing so would ensure equal treatment of all applicants and prevent administrative injustice. The affidavit emphasises that the Respondents would suffer no prejudice from the extension, while the Applicant and other candidates would be protected from unequal or unlawful recruitment practices.
6. Finally, the Applicant contends that the substratum of both the application and the petition will be defeated if urgent intervention is not granted. He maintains that the new developments in the recruitment process necessitate immediate judicial action to preserve the authority of the Court and safeguard constitutional rights. The Motion is therefore presented as a necessary step to prevent irreparable harm and ensure that the petition is heard in a meaningful and effective manner.
7. The respondent opposes the application and submits that the respondents will be prejudiced if the orders sought are granted. That the recruitments that the applicant seeks to stop were advertised even earlier than those that were the subject of the earlier application. That the recruitments have been concluded by the Board of Directors.
8. The application was canvassed via oral submissions
DETERMINATION
9. What I found troubling is the manner in which the Applicant has prosecuted this matter. The Applicant initially approached the Court and obtained interim orders. It has now returned by way of a subsequent application seeking further orders of stay on the basis of advertisements which, it is said, contemplate additional recruitment. Yet the application does not disclose with any precision when the Applicant became aware of those advertisements, why that information was not brought to the Court's attention at the earlier stage, or what steps, if any, have been taken pursuant to the advertisements.
10. That omission is not a matter of mere technicality. A party who seeks the discretionary intervention of the Court must place before it the material facts necessary to enable the Court to determine whether the relief sought is warranted. The Court cannot be invited to act upon apprehension divorced from evidence. In particular, the Applicant has not disclosed the stage which the impugned recruitment process has reached. It has not been stated whether applications have been received, whether shortlisting has occurred, whether interviews have commenced or whether any appointments have been made. The Court is therefore left to speculate as to the existence, imminence and extent of the alleged prejudice.
11. In effect the applicant is litigating in instalments. The orderly administration of justice does not permit a litigant to approach the Court in successive instalments, obtaining interim protection on one factual basis and thereafter returning whenever another circumstance emerges which could have been disclosed or addressed earlier.
12. The principle is not that a party is forever precluded from bringing a subsequent application. Circumstances may change, and the Court retains jurisdiction to respond to genuinely new facts. The question, however, is whether the subsequent application arises from a material development which could not reasonably have been placed before the Court earlier, or whether it represents an attempt to obtain a second round of interim protection by introducing a new factual foundation. The latter course is inimical to the orderly conduct of proceedings and risks converting interlocutory litigation into a succession of applications, each generating a new factual controversy.
13. The Court must accordingly guard against a process whereby interim orders obtained at one stage become the foundation for successive applications as new matters are asserted without a full account of the circumstances in which they arose. That would not merely burden the opposing parties; it would impair the finality and orderly progression of the proceedings.
14. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Applicant has laid before the Court a sufficient factual foundation for the further stay sought. The application is, in substance, an attempt to obtain a further interlocutory intervention without adequately explaining why the matter was not raised earlier and without demonstrating urgency, prejudice, and the factual basis for discretionary relief.
15. For that reason the application is denied. No order as to costs
16. As the parties have complied with the directions on the hearing of the main Petition, judgment is confirmed for 1st October 2026
DATED, SIGNED AND UPLOADED ON DIGITAL PLATFORM ON 26TH AUGUST 2026
2. The Notice of Motion dated 28th July 2026 is presented under Articles 2, 10, 19, 22, 23, 29(d), 47, 165(3), 227, 232, 258 of the Constitution as well as the Supervisory Jurisdiction Rules and the Constitution of Kenya ( Supervisory Jurisdiction and Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) High Court Practice and Procedure Rules, along with the Civil Procedure Act. The Applicant seeks conservatory relief aimed at halting what he describes as an unlawful and constitutionally offensive recruitment process undertaken by the Respondents. The Motion is anchored on the assertion that the Respondents’ actions threaten constitutional values of transparency, fairness, and lawful administrative conduct in public appointments.
3. On 28th July 2026, this Court granted orders restraining the Respondents from interviewing applicants, processing applications, or issuing employment contracts with regard to vacancies published on 4th June 2026. In the current application the substantive prayer is that the Court vary and expand the temporary injunction issued on 28th July 2026 so that it halts any recruitment advertised by the respondent. The essence of the Motion is therefore the enlargement of the existing injunction to stop the entire recruitment exercise pending determination of the petition.
4. The applicant avers that he has since discovered additional advertisements for other positions not covered by the order of 28th July 2026. He contends that the Respondents are likely to proceed with recruitment under these other advertisements, thereby undermining the efficacy of the Court’s earlier injunction. This discovery forms the core justification for seeking an expanded injunction.
5. The Applicant argues that unless the injunction is broadened, the Respondents may continue processing applications and issuing contracts under the uncovered advertisements, which would defeat the purpose of the petition and render the Court’s earlier orders ineffective. He asserts that the balance of convenience favours extending the injunction, as doing so would ensure equal treatment of all applicants and prevent administrative injustice. The affidavit emphasises that the Respondents would suffer no prejudice from the extension, while the Applicant and other candidates would be protected from unequal or unlawful recruitment practices.
6. Finally, the Applicant contends that the substratum of both the application and the petition will be defeated if urgent intervention is not granted. He maintains that the new developments in the recruitment process necessitate immediate judicial action to preserve the authority of the Court and safeguard constitutional rights. The Motion is therefore presented as a necessary step to prevent irreparable harm and ensure that the petition is heard in a meaningful and effective manner.
7. The respondent opposes the application and submits that the respondents will be prejudiced if the orders sought are granted. That the recruitments that the applicant seeks to stop were advertised even earlier than those that were the subject of the earlier application. That the recruitments have been concluded by the Board of Directors.
8. The application was canvassed via oral submissions
DETERMINATION
9. What I found troubling is the manner in which the Applicant has prosecuted this matter. The Applicant initially approached the Court and obtained interim orders. It has now returned by way of a subsequent application seeking further orders of stay on the basis of advertisements which, it is said, contemplate additional recruitment. Yet the application does not disclose with any precision when the Applicant became aware of those advertisements, why that information was not brought to the Court's attention at the earlier stage, or what steps, if any, have been taken pursuant to the advertisements.
10. That omission is not a matter of mere technicality. A party who seeks the discretionary intervention of the Court must place before it the material facts necessary to enable the Court to determine whether the relief sought is warranted. The Court cannot be invited to act upon apprehension divorced from evidence. In particular, the Applicant has not disclosed the stage which the impugned recruitment process has reached. It has not been stated whether applications have been received, whether shortlisting has occurred, whether interviews have commenced or whether any appointments have been made. The Court is therefore left to speculate as to the existence, imminence and extent of the alleged prejudice.
11. In effect the applicant is litigating in instalments. The orderly administration of justice does not permit a litigant to approach the Court in successive instalments, obtaining interim protection on one factual basis and thereafter returning whenever another circumstance emerges which could have been disclosed or addressed earlier.
12. The principle is not that a party is forever precluded from bringing a subsequent application. Circumstances may change, and the Court retains jurisdiction to respond to genuinely new facts. The question, however, is whether the subsequent application arises from a material development which could not reasonably have been placed before the Court earlier, or whether it represents an attempt to obtain a second round of interim protection by introducing a new factual foundation. The latter course is inimical to the orderly conduct of proceedings and risks converting interlocutory litigation into a succession of applications, each generating a new factual controversy.
13. The Court must accordingly guard against a process whereby interim orders obtained at one stage become the foundation for successive applications as new matters are asserted without a full account of the circumstances in which they arose. That would not merely burden the opposing parties; it would impair the finality and orderly progression of the proceedings.
14. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Applicant has laid before the Court a sufficient factual foundation for the further stay sought. The application is, in substance, an attempt to obtain a further interlocutory intervention without adequately explaining why the matter was not raised earlier and without demonstrating urgency, prejudice, and the factual basis for discretionary relief.
15. For that reason the application is denied. No order as to costs
16. As the parties have complied with the directions on the hearing of the main Petition, judgment is confirmed for 1st October 2026
DATED, SIGNED AND UPLOADED ON DIGITAL PLATFORM ON 26TH AUGUST 2026