[1] The Notice of Motion dated 28 th April 2026 was filed by the applicant, APA Insurance Company Ltd against the respondent, West Kenya Sugar Company Ltd . The application is expressed to have been filed under Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A, 63(e) and 85 of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, and all enabling provisions of the law for orders that:
[a] Spent
[b] Spent
[c] The Court be pleased to grant an order of stay of proceedings and/or further proceedings in the following five cases pending the hearing and determination of the intended suit:
[i] Kabiyet CMCC No. E097 of 2025: Geoffrey Tmata Karakacha v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[ii] Kabiyet CMCC No. E098 of 2025: Benard Ekuom Egule v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[iii] Kabiyet CMCC No. E099 of 2025: Abraham Kiprono v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[iv] Kabiyet CMCC No. E100 of 2025: Martin Ekale v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[v] Kabiyet CMCC No. E101 of 2025: Nicholus Cheruiyot v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[d] Leave be granted to the applicant to file a repudiatory suit against the respondent herein out of time in respect of claim(s) and/or any claim(s) arising from the accident that occurred on 30 th July 2025 involving the respondent’s Motor Vehicle Registration No. KTCC 645G/ZH 0379.
[e] that the costs of the application be provided for.
[2] The application was premised on the grounds that several claims have been filed against the respondent, the applicant’s insured, arising from a road traffic accident that allegedly occurred on 30 th July 2025 involving the respondent’s Motor Vehicle Registration No. KTCC 645G/ZH 0379, Tractor. The applicant averred that, upon conclusion of the cases the respondent is likely to be called upon to satisfy the judgments. The applicant further averred that so far five suits have been filed at Kabiyet Principal Magistrate’s Court, and that, it has been alleged in the said suits that the plaintiffs were passengers in the tractor aforementioned.
[3] The applicant further averred that, upon being served with the statutory notices in respect of the subject suits, it initiated investigations to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the alleged accident; and the investigations revealed a fundamental breach of the terms of the insurance contract between the parties as the claimants were unauthorized passengers. It further averred that by the time the investigation report was received by it, the three months’ statutory period within which to file a repudiatory suit had already lapsed; hence the instant application.
[4] The application was supported by the applicant’s affidavit sworn on its behalf by its Legal Officer, Jane Omondi. Attached to that affidavit were copies of the policy document, claim form filed by the respondent’s driver, the investigation report and the pleadings filed in the subject suits. The applicant reiterated the grounds aforestated and added that failure to file its repudiatory suit within the prescribed period in law was not deliberate but due to factors beyond its control.
[5] At paragraph 17 of its Supporting Affidavit, the applicant deposed that, unless the orders sought are granted, it stands to suffer irreparable loss as some of the claims filed have been scheduled for hearing, thereby exposing it to liability if and when the judgments are delivered in the subject suits.
[6] In response to the application, the respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 18 th May 2026 by its Legal and Insurance Manager, Eunice Owuor . The respondent averred that it was issued with a policy of insurance in respect of the subject motor vehicle Registration Number KTCC 645G/ZH 0379 by the applicant. It further stated that that when the said motor vehicle was involved in a road traffic accident on or about 30 th July 2025 it duly notified the applicant; and the applicant admitted liability under the policy and proceeded to settle the material damage claim arising therefrom.
[7] The respondent further deposed that, subsequently, several suits were instituted at the Principal Magistrate's court at Kabiyet being Kabiyet PMCC Nos. E097, E098, E099, E100, E101 of 2025 by claimants alleging that they were passengers in the motor vehicle in question at the time of the accident and were injured. It averred that it duly forwarded the pleadings and statutory notices in respect of the said suits to the applicant who was at all material times fully aware of the pendency of the said proceedings.
[8] The respondent took issue with the fact that, despite the applicant's knowledge of the said proceedings and receipt of the requisite statutory notices, it never issued any repudiation notice to the respondent alleging breach of policy conditions. It therefore averred that the present application is an afterthought, speculative, misconceived and a belated attempt by the applicant to evade its statutory and contractual obligations. According to the respondent, the investigation report relied on by the applicant is fundamentally deficient, speculative and devoid of probative value for the reason that it is not backed by the statement of independent eye-witnesses.
[9] The respondent averred that, since Section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act establishes a strict statutory framework whose timelines are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, the application seeking extension of time is incompetent, misconceived and legally untenable ab initio . Thus, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the instant application contending that it stands to suffer grave prejudice if the applicant were to avoid its statutory obligations under Cap 405.
[10] The application was urged orally by counsel for the parties. The applicant highlighted two points, namely, that there was no inordinate delay in bringing the application. The applicant also submitted that it has an arguable case, namely, that the respondent was carrying unauthorized passengers and therefore committed a fundamental breach of the insurance contract. The applicant reiterated that no prejudice will be suffered by the respondent as they will be heard in defence of the intended suit.
[11] The respondent on the other hand submitted that the applicant has not shown sufficient cause to warrant the issuance of the orders sought. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the dispute between the respondent and the applicant should not be the reason for the right of third parties to compensation to be jeopardized. She added that since Section 10 of Cap 405 prescribes strict timelines, the intended suit is time-barred. The respondent relied on Muchai v Xplico Insurance Co. Ltd for the proposition that the right of repudiation must be exercised within the timeframe provided for in Section 10(4) of Cap 405.
[12] The respondent also pointed out that none of the plaintiffs in the Kabiyet suits had been notified of the application and were therefore not party thereto. Therefore, the respondent posited that to grant the orders prayed for by the applicant would amount to condemning those third parties unheard.
[13] The respondent also filed written submissions dated 15 th June 2026 in which it pointed out that the primary suits concern compensation claims by injured parties while the intended declaratory proceedings concern insurance indemnity and coverage. According to the respondent the issues arising in the two sets of proceedings are distinct and can proceed independently without any prejudice to the applicant. The respondent made reference to APA Insurance Company v Vincent Nthuka [2018] KEHC 5981 (KLR) and Willis Onditi Odhiambo v Gateway Insurance Co. Ltd [2014] KECA 186 (KLR).
[14] I have given due consideration to the application, the affidavits filed in respect thereof and the submissions made by learned counsel. The two issues for determination are:
[a] Whether the court has jurisdiction to extend time for purposes of Section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act; and if so,
[b] Whether sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant to warrant stay of proceedings in the lower court suits pending the hearing and determination of the intended repudiatory suit.
[15] The applicant relied on Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A, 63(e) and 85 of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act as the key enabling provisions. That provision states:
No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section if in an action commenced before, or within three months after, the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, he has obtained a declaration that, apart from any provision contained in the policy he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular, or, if he has avoided the policy on that ground, that he was entitled so to do apart from any provision contained in it:
Provided that an insurer who has obtained such a declaration as aforesaid in an action shall not thereby become entitled to the benefit of this subsection as respects any judgment obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action, unless before or within fourteen days after the commencement of that action he has given notice thereof to the person who is the plaintiff in the said proceedings specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely, and any person to whom notice of such action is so given shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto.
[16] The aforesaid provision merely provides an insurer with a cause of action for the purpose of avoiding an insurance contract on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. It also sets the limitation period of three months from the commencement of the primary claim in respect of the policy. It does not make specific provision for extension of time; and therefore the question to pose is whether the Court has jurisdiction to extend the limitation period provided for in Section 10 of Cap 405.
[17] That the issue of jurisdiction is primordial cannot be gainsaid. In the Owners of Motor Vessel "Lilian s" v Caltex Oil (K) Ltd [1989] KLR 1:
"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."
[18] Hence, where the jurisdiction of the Court is impugned, the Court must make a determination as to whether it does have the power to entertain the dispute. And, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR:
"A court's jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred by law. We agree with counsel for the first and second Respondents in his submission that the issue as to whether a court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it is not one of mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the court cannot entertain any proceedings...Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a court of law, the court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation. Nor can Parliament confer jurisdiction upon a court of law beyond the scope defined by the Constitution. Where the Constitution confers power on Parliament to set the jurisdiction of a court of law or tribunal, the legislature would be within its authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of such a court or tribunal by statute law."
[19] The general position is that a court cannot invoke its inherent jurisdiction to address an issue when there is an express and specific statutory provision dealing with the same issue. For instance, in Takaful Insurance of Africa v Badar Hardware Ltd [2024] KEHC 13753 (KLR) it was held as follows:
“39. …a Court cannot invoke its inherent jurisdiction to address an issue when there is an express and specific statutory provision dealing with the same issue. It will be wrong for the Court to disregard such express statutory provision and purport to invoke its inherent powers to grant that which the statute does not. This is because the limitation period the subject hereof is not prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules but by the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act which, in the wisdom of its drafters, does not provide for any extension of time. The Civil Procedure Rules, being delegated or subsidiary legislation, cannot by any stretch of imagination, be invoked to “sneak in”, introduce or confer a benefit which the applicable statute, the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act does not. If Parliament intended to grant the Courts the power to enlarge time to allow insurance declaratory suits to be filed out of time, then nothing would have stopped it from expressly stating so within that same Act.
40. In view of the foregoing finding, my conclusion is that this Court does not possess the jurisdiction to extend time to allow an insurance declaratory suit to be filed out of time. For this reason, the remaining issue of whether the delay to institute the suit within time is excusable no longer arises and I will not therefore belabour it.”
[20] Similarly, in Republic v Principal Magistrate P. Ngare Gesora & 2 Others, Ex parte Nation Media Group Ltd [2013] eKLR stated:
“ However , where a certain cause of action is disallowed by law, the issues of the path of justice being clogged does not arise since in that case justice demands that a claim should not be brought. Justice, it has been said time without a number, must be done in accordance with the law……….” It must however be remembered that what the law of Limitation Act provides is that certain causes of action may not be brought after expiry of a particular period of time. In other words, the Act bars the bringing of particular actions after the specified periods of Limitation……”
[21] The same finding was made in Anaclet Kalia Musau (suing on behalf of the estate of Vincent Mangalo Kalia (Deceased) v Attorney General & 2 others [2015] KEHC 532 (KLR), as follows:
29. The above principles of law are in my view applicable to this case. Irrespective of the merits of the claim, the law is clear that such action shall not be brought against the Government after the expiry of twelve months and upon such expiry, the claim is extinguished such that the Limitation of Actions Act which allows similar causes of action against private individuals to be filed out of the stipulated statutory period with leave of court does not apply.
30. In addition, it cannot be said that the matter of Limitation of Actions is a procedural technicality curable by Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution or the overriding objectives principles espoused under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act. In my view, statutory provisions limiting time within which a substantive cause of action should be brought cannot be equated to procedural technicalities envisaged under Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution. They are not procedural lapses that do not go to the root or substance of the matter under consideration such as filing suit by way of Notice of Motion instead of plaint or citing wrong provisions of the law.
[22] The above decision of the High Court was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Anaclet Kalia Musau v Attorney General & 2 Others [2020] KECA 723 (KLR). Hence, the Court of Appeal was categorical that:
Like the learned Judge, we can only sympathize with the appellant for his loss. But the overriding purpose of all limitation statutes is based on the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation. A party will not be permitted to prosecute stale claims. On the other hand, a party will be protected against such claims when he has lost evidence for his defence; and that a party with a valid cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence. See Mehta v Shah (supra).”
[23] In the premises, it is my finding that the Notice of Motion dated 28 th April 2026 is misconceived as to extension of time. That being the case, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to determine the rest of the issues raised in the said application. The same is hereby struck out with costs.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026
[a] Spent
[b] Spent
[c] The Court be pleased to grant an order of stay of proceedings and/or further proceedings in the following five cases pending the hearing and determination of the intended suit:
[i] Kabiyet CMCC No. E097 of 2025: Geoffrey Tmata Karakacha v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[ii] Kabiyet CMCC No. E098 of 2025: Benard Ekuom Egule v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[iii] Kabiyet CMCC No. E099 of 2025: Abraham Kiprono v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[iv] Kabiyet CMCC No. E100 of 2025: Martin Ekale v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[v] Kabiyet CMCC No. E101 of 2025: Nicholus Cheruiyot v West Kenya Sugar Co. Ltd.
[d] Leave be granted to the applicant to file a repudiatory suit against the respondent herein out of time in respect of claim(s) and/or any claim(s) arising from the accident that occurred on 30 th July 2025 involving the respondent’s Motor Vehicle Registration No. KTCC 645G/ZH 0379.
[e] that the costs of the application be provided for.
[2] The application was premised on the grounds that several claims have been filed against the respondent, the applicant’s insured, arising from a road traffic accident that allegedly occurred on 30 th July 2025 involving the respondent’s Motor Vehicle Registration No. KTCC 645G/ZH 0379, Tractor. The applicant averred that, upon conclusion of the cases the respondent is likely to be called upon to satisfy the judgments. The applicant further averred that so far five suits have been filed at Kabiyet Principal Magistrate’s Court, and that, it has been alleged in the said suits that the plaintiffs were passengers in the tractor aforementioned.
[3] The applicant further averred that, upon being served with the statutory notices in respect of the subject suits, it initiated investigations to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the alleged accident; and the investigations revealed a fundamental breach of the terms of the insurance contract between the parties as the claimants were unauthorized passengers. It further averred that by the time the investigation report was received by it, the three months’ statutory period within which to file a repudiatory suit had already lapsed; hence the instant application.
[4] The application was supported by the applicant’s affidavit sworn on its behalf by its Legal Officer, Jane Omondi. Attached to that affidavit were copies of the policy document, claim form filed by the respondent’s driver, the investigation report and the pleadings filed in the subject suits. The applicant reiterated the grounds aforestated and added that failure to file its repudiatory suit within the prescribed period in law was not deliberate but due to factors beyond its control.
[5] At paragraph 17 of its Supporting Affidavit, the applicant deposed that, unless the orders sought are granted, it stands to suffer irreparable loss as some of the claims filed have been scheduled for hearing, thereby exposing it to liability if and when the judgments are delivered in the subject suits.
[6] In response to the application, the respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 18 th May 2026 by its Legal and Insurance Manager, Eunice Owuor . The respondent averred that it was issued with a policy of insurance in respect of the subject motor vehicle Registration Number KTCC 645G/ZH 0379 by the applicant. It further stated that that when the said motor vehicle was involved in a road traffic accident on or about 30 th July 2025 it duly notified the applicant; and the applicant admitted liability under the policy and proceeded to settle the material damage claim arising therefrom.
[7] The respondent further deposed that, subsequently, several suits were instituted at the Principal Magistrate's court at Kabiyet being Kabiyet PMCC Nos. E097, E098, E099, E100, E101 of 2025 by claimants alleging that they were passengers in the motor vehicle in question at the time of the accident and were injured. It averred that it duly forwarded the pleadings and statutory notices in respect of the said suits to the applicant who was at all material times fully aware of the pendency of the said proceedings.
[8] The respondent took issue with the fact that, despite the applicant's knowledge of the said proceedings and receipt of the requisite statutory notices, it never issued any repudiation notice to the respondent alleging breach of policy conditions. It therefore averred that the present application is an afterthought, speculative, misconceived and a belated attempt by the applicant to evade its statutory and contractual obligations. According to the respondent, the investigation report relied on by the applicant is fundamentally deficient, speculative and devoid of probative value for the reason that it is not backed by the statement of independent eye-witnesses.
[9] The respondent averred that, since Section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act establishes a strict statutory framework whose timelines are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, the application seeking extension of time is incompetent, misconceived and legally untenable ab initio . Thus, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the instant application contending that it stands to suffer grave prejudice if the applicant were to avoid its statutory obligations under Cap 405.
[10] The application was urged orally by counsel for the parties. The applicant highlighted two points, namely, that there was no inordinate delay in bringing the application. The applicant also submitted that it has an arguable case, namely, that the respondent was carrying unauthorized passengers and therefore committed a fundamental breach of the insurance contract. The applicant reiterated that no prejudice will be suffered by the respondent as they will be heard in defence of the intended suit.
[11] The respondent on the other hand submitted that the applicant has not shown sufficient cause to warrant the issuance of the orders sought. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the dispute between the respondent and the applicant should not be the reason for the right of third parties to compensation to be jeopardized. She added that since Section 10 of Cap 405 prescribes strict timelines, the intended suit is time-barred. The respondent relied on Muchai v Xplico Insurance Co. Ltd for the proposition that the right of repudiation must be exercised within the timeframe provided for in Section 10(4) of Cap 405.
[12] The respondent also pointed out that none of the plaintiffs in the Kabiyet suits had been notified of the application and were therefore not party thereto. Therefore, the respondent posited that to grant the orders prayed for by the applicant would amount to condemning those third parties unheard.
[13] The respondent also filed written submissions dated 15 th June 2026 in which it pointed out that the primary suits concern compensation claims by injured parties while the intended declaratory proceedings concern insurance indemnity and coverage. According to the respondent the issues arising in the two sets of proceedings are distinct and can proceed independently without any prejudice to the applicant. The respondent made reference to APA Insurance Company v Vincent Nthuka [2018] KEHC 5981 (KLR) and Willis Onditi Odhiambo v Gateway Insurance Co. Ltd [2014] KECA 186 (KLR).
[14] I have given due consideration to the application, the affidavits filed in respect thereof and the submissions made by learned counsel. The two issues for determination are:
[a] Whether the court has jurisdiction to extend time for purposes of Section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act; and if so,
[b] Whether sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant to warrant stay of proceedings in the lower court suits pending the hearing and determination of the intended repudiatory suit.
[15] The applicant relied on Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A, 63(e) and 85 of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act as the key enabling provisions. That provision states:
No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section if in an action commenced before, or within three months after, the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, he has obtained a declaration that, apart from any provision contained in the policy he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular, or, if he has avoided the policy on that ground, that he was entitled so to do apart from any provision contained in it:
Provided that an insurer who has obtained such a declaration as aforesaid in an action shall not thereby become entitled to the benefit of this subsection as respects any judgment obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action, unless before or within fourteen days after the commencement of that action he has given notice thereof to the person who is the plaintiff in the said proceedings specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely, and any person to whom notice of such action is so given shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto.
[16] The aforesaid provision merely provides an insurer with a cause of action for the purpose of avoiding an insurance contract on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. It also sets the limitation period of three months from the commencement of the primary claim in respect of the policy. It does not make specific provision for extension of time; and therefore the question to pose is whether the Court has jurisdiction to extend the limitation period provided for in Section 10 of Cap 405.
[17] That the issue of jurisdiction is primordial cannot be gainsaid. In the Owners of Motor Vessel "Lilian s" v Caltex Oil (K) Ltd [1989] KLR 1:
"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."
[18] Hence, where the jurisdiction of the Court is impugned, the Court must make a determination as to whether it does have the power to entertain the dispute. And, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR:
"A court's jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred by law. We agree with counsel for the first and second Respondents in his submission that the issue as to whether a court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it is not one of mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the court cannot entertain any proceedings...Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a court of law, the court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation. Nor can Parliament confer jurisdiction upon a court of law beyond the scope defined by the Constitution. Where the Constitution confers power on Parliament to set the jurisdiction of a court of law or tribunal, the legislature would be within its authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of such a court or tribunal by statute law."
[19] The general position is that a court cannot invoke its inherent jurisdiction to address an issue when there is an express and specific statutory provision dealing with the same issue. For instance, in Takaful Insurance of Africa v Badar Hardware Ltd [2024] KEHC 13753 (KLR) it was held as follows:
“39. …a Court cannot invoke its inherent jurisdiction to address an issue when there is an express and specific statutory provision dealing with the same issue. It will be wrong for the Court to disregard such express statutory provision and purport to invoke its inherent powers to grant that which the statute does not. This is because the limitation period the subject hereof is not prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules but by the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act which, in the wisdom of its drafters, does not provide for any extension of time. The Civil Procedure Rules, being delegated or subsidiary legislation, cannot by any stretch of imagination, be invoked to “sneak in”, introduce or confer a benefit which the applicable statute, the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act does not. If Parliament intended to grant the Courts the power to enlarge time to allow insurance declaratory suits to be filed out of time, then nothing would have stopped it from expressly stating so within that same Act.
40. In view of the foregoing finding, my conclusion is that this Court does not possess the jurisdiction to extend time to allow an insurance declaratory suit to be filed out of time. For this reason, the remaining issue of whether the delay to institute the suit within time is excusable no longer arises and I will not therefore belabour it.”
[20] Similarly, in Republic v Principal Magistrate P. Ngare Gesora & 2 Others, Ex parte Nation Media Group Ltd [2013] eKLR stated:
“ However , where a certain cause of action is disallowed by law, the issues of the path of justice being clogged does not arise since in that case justice demands that a claim should not be brought. Justice, it has been said time without a number, must be done in accordance with the law……….” It must however be remembered that what the law of Limitation Act provides is that certain causes of action may not be brought after expiry of a particular period of time. In other words, the Act bars the bringing of particular actions after the specified periods of Limitation……”
[21] The same finding was made in Anaclet Kalia Musau (suing on behalf of the estate of Vincent Mangalo Kalia (Deceased) v Attorney General & 2 others [2015] KEHC 532 (KLR), as follows:
29. The above principles of law are in my view applicable to this case. Irrespective of the merits of the claim, the law is clear that such action shall not be brought against the Government after the expiry of twelve months and upon such expiry, the claim is extinguished such that the Limitation of Actions Act which allows similar causes of action against private individuals to be filed out of the stipulated statutory period with leave of court does not apply.
30. In addition, it cannot be said that the matter of Limitation of Actions is a procedural technicality curable by Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution or the overriding objectives principles espoused under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act. In my view, statutory provisions limiting time within which a substantive cause of action should be brought cannot be equated to procedural technicalities envisaged under Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution. They are not procedural lapses that do not go to the root or substance of the matter under consideration such as filing suit by way of Notice of Motion instead of plaint or citing wrong provisions of the law.
[22] The above decision of the High Court was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Anaclet Kalia Musau v Attorney General & 2 Others [2020] KECA 723 (KLR). Hence, the Court of Appeal was categorical that:
Like the learned Judge, we can only sympathize with the appellant for his loss. But the overriding purpose of all limitation statutes is based on the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation. A party will not be permitted to prosecute stale claims. On the other hand, a party will be protected against such claims when he has lost evidence for his defence; and that a party with a valid cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence. See Mehta v Shah (supra).”
[23] In the premises, it is my finding that the Notice of Motion dated 28 th April 2026 is misconceived as to extension of time. That being the case, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to determine the rest of the issues raised in the said application. The same is hereby struck out with costs.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026