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A. Background
1. The Petitioner instituted the instant suit by way of a petition dated 29th April 2025 challenging the constitutionality, legality and validity of the procedures undertaken in submitting and processing of a motion dated 8th April 2025 seeking to remove her from the office of the Speaker of the 1st Respondent. She seeks to stop her removal from the office of the Speaker of the 1st Respondent. The petition is anchored on grounds in the body of the petition and supported by an affidavit sworn by the Petitioner on even date and a further affidavit dated 15th May 2025.
2. The Petitioner contends that, despite this Court issuing conservatory orders on 27th March 2025 to halt any further processing or consideration of the motion for her removal, the 4th Respondent proceeded to reproduce the same motion, and circulated it among the 5th to 37th Respondents for signatures in support and subsequently resubmitted it as a new motion dated 8th April 2025. The Petitioner asserts that the 4th Respondent, being fully aware of the conservatory orders issued by this Court, acted in contempt and in blatant disregard of those orders.
3. The Petitioner states that the 2nd Respondent, despite being fully aware of the conservatory orders issued by this Court, proceeded to receive and process the motion for her removal by serving it upon her.
4. It is the Petitioner’s case that by signing in support of and resubmitting the impugned motion dated 17th March 2025, the 3rd – 37th Respondents are attempting to circumvent court orders by reintroducing the suspended motion through the backdoor. This, she argues, amounts to a blatant act of contempt and mockery of the authority of this Court.
5. The Petitioner further asserts that the resubmission of the impugned motion constitutes an abuse of legal process and of the procedures of the 1st Respondent. She contends that it contravenes Standing Order 43(2)(b) of the 1st Respondent’s Standing Orders, which prohibits the moving of a special motion more than once within the same session.
6. It is the Petitioner’s case that the motion was irregularly received by an employee of the 1st Respondent who lacked the authority or mandate to act on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, who is by law authorized to receive such a motion and ensure determination of the admissibility under Standing Order 44(3).
7. The Petitioner swears that the resubmission of the motion by the 4th Respondent violates the rule against double jeopardy, as it would require her to defend herself against two identical motions before the 1st Respondent.
8. She further alleges that, in pursuit of their unlawful agenda to remove her from office, the 3rd, 4th 5th, and 37th Respondents physically assaulted her on 8th April 2025, the same day the impugned motion was served on the 1st Respondent. She claims that they escalated the violence by invading her office, barricading her inside, and preventing her from accessing the chambers of the 1st Respondent or conducting any lawful and constitutional business.
9. The Petitioner also contends that the signature pages of the motion dated 8th April 2025 contain material discrepancies. Specifically, that the alleged signatures of the 11th, 12th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 25th, 26th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 35th Respondents differ significantly from those in the original motion dated 17th March 2025. She further claims that the 2nd Respondent failed to authenticate the names, national identity card numbers, and signatures in the annexed list, as is standard practice, to confirm whether the motion meet the minimum threshold of support required under Section 11(3)(b) of the County Governments Act, 2012.
10. The Petitioner states that she was only served with an unauthenticated photocopy of the motion, which lacked any supporting documents or evidence for the grounds raised by the 4th Respondent. She argues that this undermines her right to a fair hearing, as it denies her the opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence presented against her. She further asserts that she has a constitutional right to access information held by the 2nd and 4th Respondents, which is necessary for her to exercise and protect her rights and fundamental freedoms from being violated. She urged that this right is guaranteed under Article 35 of the Constitution and Section 4(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act, 2016.
11. The Petitioner depones that the 3rd Respondent, who is expected to preside over the debate and voting on the impugned motion in his capacity as Deputy Speaker of the 1st Respondent pursuant to Standing Order 58(3), is openly biased against her. She claims that the 3rd Respondent is significantly conflicted and will not afford her a fair hearing, thereby violating her right to fair administrative action. Thus, she sought that the prayers outlined in the Petition be granted.
12. The Respondents oppose the petition.
B. 1st & 2nd respondents’ response
13. The 1st and 2nd Respondents oppose this petition through their reply to the petition dated 24th June 2025. The affidavit is sworn by the 2nd Respondent in his capacity as the Clerk to the 1st Respondent.
14. It is deponed that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter at this stage as the petition raises procedural issues that are best resolved by the 1st Respondent. It is argued that the Court should exercise restraint in accordance with the doctrines of separation of powers and judicial restraint. It is further sworn that granting the substantive reliefs sought by the Petitioner would undermine the authority of the 1st Respondent and violate the principle of checks and balances, which is a cornerstone of public governance.
15. The 1st and 2nd Respondents contend that granting the reliefs sought by the Petitioner would effectively shield the Petitioner from any future accountability processes initiated by the 1st Respondent, thereby promoting impunity in public service.
16. It is deponed that the 2nd Respondent, in strict compliance with the Court’s Conservatory orders, did not process or forward or submit the impugned motion to the 1st Respondent.
17. The Respondents further state that a fresh Notice of Intention to move a motion for the Petitioner’s impeachment, dated 8th April 2025, was submitted by the 4th Respondent. They argue that this is a new motion initiated by a different member of the 1st Respondent and, therefore, is not subject to the conservatory orders previously issued by the Court.
18. It is sworn that the doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply to constitutionally mandated political accountability processes, such as impeachment, and thus cannot aid a public officer to avoid legitimate political accountability mechanisms such as impeachment proceedings.
19. The 1st and 2nd Respondents maintain that there are no clear legal or constitutional infractions that would justify the Court’s intervention at this stage of the process.
20. It is further deponed that no member of the 1st Respondent has lodged any complaint regarding improper procurement or forgery of their signatures and the Petitioner’s allegations in this regard are untrue and unsubstantiated. The Respondents also deny any involvement in acts of violence, harassment, or intimidation against the Petitioner, asserting that these claims are false and not backed by credible evidence.
21. It is deponed that the 2nd Respondent served the Petitioner with a clear, legible and decipherable Notice of Motion dated 17th March 2025 as received from a member of the 1st Respondent. That the Petitioner even annexed this motion to the petition and sought further particulars in her letter dated the same day. That she did not raise concerns about the clarity of the motion at the time, making her current allegations appear unfounded and an afterthought.
22. The 1st and 2nd Respondents argue that the office of the Leader of the Majority Party is a legitimate office within the 1st Respondent, held by one of its members. Therefore, the Petitioner’s claims of a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers are unfounded.
23. It is deponed that the Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence or specific details to support her allegations of malice or bias in the processing of the impugned motion.
C. 3rd to 47th respondent’s response
24. The 4th Respondent swore an affidavit dated 8th May 2025 in opposition and in response to the petition in his capacity as a Member of the County Assembly, the Assembly’s Majority whip, Deputy Leader of the majority party of the Assembly and mover of the motion to remove the petitioner from office.
25. He depones that this petition is unmerited, in bad faith and should be dismissed in limine, at the preliminary stage. He argues that it fails to meet the threshold established in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) (1978) KLR 154 (and as emphasized in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society for Human Rights Alliance & Others (2013) eKLR). Specifically, the petition does not identify with reasonable precision the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated or threatened, nor does it provide sufficient detail on the manner of the alleged violations.
26. It is the 3rd to 47th Respondent’s position that judicial intervention can only be invoked after the County Assembly has completed its constitutional function, in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. It is deponed that both the substantive and procedural legal requirements governing the removal of a speaker have been strictly followed.
27. The 4th Respondent asserts that granting the orders sought by the Petitioner would effectively paralyze the operations of the County Assembly and hinder its constitutional mandate to oversee service delivery to the people of Machakos County.
28. He contends that the conservatory orders issued by this Court did not bar him or any other member of the County Assembly from tabling a fresh motion seeking the Petitioner’s impeachment. Therefore, he denies having acted in blatant disregard of the Court’s orders as alleged.
29. The 4th Respondent denies assaulting the Petitioner as alleged. He argues that the mere filing of a report with investigative authorities does not establish his liability. He further depones that no medical evidence, such as a doctor’s report, has been presented to confirm that the Petitioner was assaulted by individuals known to her. They urged that no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioner since impeachment is a lawful mandate of the County Assembly to be performed pursuant to the powers granted by the Constitution, the Petitioner will be granted an ample opportunity to be heard by the Assembly, and that the court will still be available at the appropriate time to interrogate compliance with the substantive and procedural law and give appropriate remedy.
D. Petitioner’s response
30. The Petitioner swore further affidavits in response to the averment by the Respondents.
31. In response to the 1st and 2nd Respondent, the petitioner depones that the fact that a different member of the 1st Respondent was the mover of the motion does not distinguish it from the original motion. She argues that both motions share the same objective and the grounds, a fact the Respondents have not denied.
32. The Petitioner further asserts that the test established in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1978] KLR 154 does not require rigid or overly formal identification of specific constitutional provisions. Instead, the test requires that the complaints in a constitutional petition be framed in a manner that gives sufficient notice of the nature of the claims, allowing the Respondents to adequately prepare their case. She relies on the decision in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 Others; Matemu (Interested Party); with Kenya Human Rights Commission & Another (Amicus Curiae) [2012] KEHC 2480 (KLR), and asserts that her petition meets this threshold.
33. The Petitioner maintains that, contrary to the Respondents’ assertion, this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in impeachment proceedings and other political processes where violations of the Constitution and other statutory requirements are demonstrated. She cites the cases of Huka & 2 others v County Assembly of Isiolo & another; Kenya Kwanza Coalition & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2023] KEHC 18212 (KLR) in support of this position.
34. She cited the case of Mwangaza v County Assembly of Meru [2025] KEHC 2059 (KLR) and argued that the court held that the Meru County Assembly acted in contempt of court by initiating a fresh impeachment motion against Governor Mwangaza despite a court order restraining such actions, and the court emphasized that circumventing judicial orders undermines the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers.
35. It is her case that contrary to the averments by the Respondents, the conservatory orders she seeks do not grant her a blanket immunity from future accountability processes. Rather, they are intended to protect her fundamental constitutional rights from being infringement or violation pending the hearing and determination of this petition.
36. In response to the 3rd to 47th Respondents, the Petitioner reiterates that this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in impeachment proceedings and other political processes where constitutional or statutory violation are established as affirmed in Huka & 2 others v County Assembly of Isiolo & another; Kenya Kwanza Coalition & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2023] KEHC 18212 (KLR).
37. It is her case that allegations by the 4th Respondent that the conservatory orders only related to the motion dated March 17, 2025 are erroneous and illogical as the resubmitted motion dated 8th April, 2025 is a replica of the original, and the court orders issued in relation to the original motion must also apply to its duplicate. Therefore, the processing of the resubmitted motion is equally subject to the conservatory orders.
E. Parties’ submissions
38. The Petition was heard by way of submissions. The Petitioner’s submissions are dated 1st July 2025; the 1st and 2nd Respondents written submissions are dated 23rd June 2025, while the 4th to 37th Respondents’ submission are dated 19th May 2025.
(a) Petitioner’s submissions
39. The Petitioner outlines the background and facts of the case and sets out six issues for determination, namely: whether the impugned motion was resubmitted in contempt of court orders, thus a nullity; whether this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs and processed of the 1st Respondent under the circumstances that gave rise to the petition herein; whether the process of initiating, filing and submissions of the impugned motion violated the Petitioner’s right under the Constitution, the County Government Act and the County Assembly of Machakos Standing Orders; whether the 3rd Respondent is suited to preside over the debate and voting of the impugned motion based on the bias and confliction he had demonstrated; whether the reliefs sought are merited and who should bear the costs of this Petition.
40. The Petitioner submitted that the motion to remove the Speaker dated 8th April 2025 is an exact replica of a previous motion dated 17th March 2025. She urged that by resubmitting this motion, the Respondents acted in blatant breach and contempt of orders issued in HCCRPET E010 of 2025 and HCCRPET E012 of 2025 that had barred them from processing the original motion, thus she asserts that the motion dated 8th April 2025 is a nullity and of no legal effect. She relies on the case of Mwangaza v County Assembly of Meru (Petition E013 of 2023)(2025)KEHC 2059 (KLR).
41. The Petitioner urged that the Court has the jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs of the County Assembly where there is a violation of the Constitution, disregard of court orders and where they have acted unlawfully. That the doctrine of judicial restraint and the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply in the circumstance. Reference was made to the following cases: Jayne Mati & Another v Attorney General and Another Nairobi Petition No 108 of 2011 eKLR; Huka & 2 Others v County Assembly of Isiolo & Another; Kenya Kwanza Coaliation & 2 Others (Interested Parties) (2023) KEHC 18212 KLR; Gachagua & 40 others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 others; Law Society of Kenya & 7 others (Interested Parties) (2024) KEHC 13473(KLR) to urge that the courts have the mandate to hear this dispute.
42. The Petitioner also claimed that her rights under Article 50, right to fair hearing, Article 47, Right to fair administrative action; Article 35, right to access information, were all violated. She urged that she was subjected to double jeopardy by resubmission of an identical motion while the original one was still active, pending determination.
43. In conclusion she urged the Court to find that the entire process is tainted with illegalities and procedural flaws and proceed to grant the relief sought in the petition.
(b) 1st and 2nd Respondents submissions
44. The 1st and 2nd Respondents identified two issues for determination: whether this honourable Court has jurisdiction to determine this petition, and whether the petition has merit.
45. On the first issue, it is submitted this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition at this stage while the matter is still active before the 1st Respondent in line with the doctrines of separation of powers, judicial restraint and institutional comity. That the Court must allow other arms of government to carry out their constitutional functions without undue interference. In support they cited the decisions in Nyeri Civil Application No. E093 of 2023; Hon. Kawira Mwangaza vs County Assembly of Meru and Another, Sonko v. County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 Others (Petition 11 (E008) of 2022) [2022] KESC 76 (KLR), and Charity Kaluki Ngilu v County Assembly of Kitui & 2 others [2020] eKLR.
46. It is further submitted that where it is shown that the 1st and 2nd Respondents are acting within their constitutional and statutory mandates under the Constitution and the County Governments Act, this Court should refrain from issuing injunctive relief or interfering with the process. They rely on Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another [2017] eKLR and in Gachagua v The Speaker of the National Assembly & 3 others (Petition E550 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 12876 (KLR) and by the Court of Appeal in Martin Nyaga Wambora v Speaker of the Senate & Others (2014) eKLR.
47. On the second issue, it is submitted that the petition lacks merit, and merely raises procedural concerns that should first be addressed before the 1st Respondent prior to being brought before this Court.
48. It is urged that the question of whether the motion by the 4th Respondent is in breach of existing conservatory orders, is a matter reserved for determination by the court that issued those orders.
49. Regarding the Petitioner’s allegations of bias and conflict of interest, the Respondents argue that these claims are based on mere apprehension and are not supported by any credible evidence. They point to Section 9(4) of the County Governments Act, which provides a clear remedy in such circumstances. It is contended that the Petitioner’s fears are premature and speculative since the 1st Respondent has not yet formally considered the motion.
50. It is argued that invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy to shield against an impeachment motion is misplaced. They urge the Court to exercise restraint in reviewing parliamentary procedures, particularly in matters that are still active before legislative bodies. They rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney-General & another; Law Society of Kenya & 2 others (Amicus Curiae) (Advisory Opinion Reference 2 of 2013) [2013] KESC 7 (KLR).
51. This Court is invited to reject the Petitioner’s request to scrutinize every alleged procedural irregularity and use that as a basis to quash or stay a constitutional process assigned to another arm of government. They rely on Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General & 4 Others [2013] to reinforce this position.
52. It is submitted that the Petitioner will not suffer prejudice if the legislative process is allowed to proceed. They argue that this Court retains the power to review the entire process upon its conclusion and determine its compliance with the Constitution. Where appropriate, the Court may issue orders including nullification of the process or compensation where applicable. They cite the decision in Gachagua & 40 others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 others; Law Society of Kenya & 7 others, in this regard.
(c) 3rd to 47th Respondents submissions
53. The 3rd to 47th Respondents set out the background of the dispute that led to the filing of this petition. They stated that the petition is a replica of the application and hence their response and submissions to the application be deemed as sufficient response to this Petition. They set out five issues for determination which can be summarised as: whether the petition meets the threshold for grant of the orders sought; whether the Court has jurisdiction to review a decision made by a County Assembly and whether such a review violates the doctrine of separation of powers; whether the Petitioner’s right to a fair hearing was violated; and whether the Petitioner’s action have paralyzed the operations of the Respondents.
54. They relied on the case of Gitirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others; Mrao vs First American Bank of Kenya Limited & 2 Others (2003) KLR 125; David Ndii & Others v Attorney General (2021)eKLR to submit that the Petitioner had not established a prima facie case to obtain the orders being sought. It was their submission that no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioner since impeachment is a lawful process, and that the courts will still be available at the appropriate time to interrogate compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural law.
55. They contended that the facts constituting the grounds for the removal from office met the requirements of section 11(3)(c ) and 4 of the County Government Act. They urged that the process for the impeachment of the Petitioner had commenced and had been conducted in a lawful and procedural manner by an institution mandated by law.
56. On jurisdiction it was submitted that an impeachment process is quasi-judicial in nature and that courts come in to determine the legality of the procedure. They urged that in this instance, it is premature for the Court to intervene as the impeachment process has not been finalized. They argued that the Petitioner is abusing the court process with the intention of disrupting statutory timelines and the discharge of the County Assembly functions.
57. It was stated that the Petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard and to be allowed to defend herself has not been violated in any way since the procedure for impeachment has been provided for under section 11(5)c and 7 of the County Government Act and Standing Orders which ensures that the Speaker is accorded adequate opportunity and facility to be heard. That every step so far has been done in strict compliance with the Constitution, the Standing Orders, and the County Government Act.
58. In conclusion, they urged the Court to find that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of allowing the Respondents to proceed with their lawful duties and responsibilities and in the interest of the proper functioning of the County Assembly.
F. Analysis and determination
59. After a perusal of the pleadings, the responses, affidavits, the written submissions and list and bundles of authorities herein, the first fundamental issue that emerges for determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition. The determination of this issue will determine whether this Court should delve into the merits of the petition or not.
60. Jurisdiction is the authority given to a court to hear and determine disputes before it. It is either granted by the Constitution, statute or both. If the court determines that it has no jurisdiction to hear the matter, it must down its tools. This was stipulated in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR) and the Supreme Court decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR.
61. The Petitioner contends that her constitutional and statutory right have been infringed or are threatened with violation thus bringing this matter within the jurisdiction of this court. On the other hand, the Respondents’ stand is that this Court is divested of jurisdiction to entertain this petition at this stage, by dint of the doctrines of judicial restraint, institutional comity and separation of powers.
62. The jurisdiction of this Court is provided for under Article 165 (3) of the Constitution. Pursuant to this provision, the High Court has jurisdiction, amongst others, to determine the question of whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened.
63. In addition, Article 23(1) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 165 of the Constitution, to hear and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights. Further, Article 165(6) grants the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and “over any person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.”
64. The Supreme Court is categorical, through its decisions, on when a court can intervene in a process vested in other arms of government, emphasizing on the need to exercise judicial restraint and adherent to the ripeness principle where the court only assume jurisdiction when a matter is fully ripe for the court’s intervention. In Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 others; Commission on Administrative Justice (Amicus Curiae); Law Society of Kenya (Interested Party) [2014] KEHC 7493 (KLR), the Supreme Court observed at paragraph 120, as follows:
“We fully acknowledge the need for the Court to exercise restraint in dealing with matters vested in the other arms of government by the Constitution.”
65. Further at paragraph 128, the apex Court continued thus:
“We are bolstered in this finding by the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Speaker of the Senate and Another v The Hon. Attorney General and 3 others, Advisory Opinion Reference No. 2 of 2013. In that case, the respondents had argued that pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, the Judiciary had no legitimate business to intervene in matters falling within the legislative competence of Parliament. Further, that Parliament’s business was strictly conducted within its own standing orders which are recognised by the Constitution.
129. The Court recognised the legislative authority vested in Parliament by the Constitution, and said it would be reluctant to question Parliamentary procedures or workings, as long as they did not breach the Constitution. However, where a dispute arises which alleges violation of the Constitution, then judicial intervention would not be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as the Court would merely be performing its solemn duty under the Constitution.”
66. In the instant case, the Petitioner argues that this Court has adequate jurisdiction to interfere with the impeachment proceedings and other political processes if it establishes violations of the Constitution and other statutory requirements. She claims that her right to fair hearing has been and will be grossly violated; as she was only served with an unauthenticated photocopy of the motion which did not contain any documents or evidence in support of the grounds raised by the 4th Respondent therefore, denying her the opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence produced by the 4th Respondent.
67. It is also her case that that the 3rd Respondent who is slated to preside over the debate and voting of the impugned motion in his capacity of the Deputy Speaker of the 1st Respondent in line with Standing Order 58(3) is openly biased against her, is greatly conflicted and will not accord her a fair hearing and her right to fair administrative action will be grossly violated and prejudiced.
68. The Respondents on the other hand urge that all these contentions can be canvassed and are better addressed during the impeachment process. Thus, they urge that it is premature to raise them before a court at this juncture.
69. This Court notes that the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney General & 4 others, Reference No 2 of 2013; [2013] eKLR held that it would be averse to questioning Parliamentary procedures that are formulated by the Houses to regulate their internal workings as long as the same do not breach the Constitution. The Supreme Court went on to caution against undue interference with running processes in other arms of Government. It pronounced itself at paragraph 61, thus:
“This court will not question each and every procedural infraction that may occur in either of the Houses of Parliament. The court cannot supervise the workings of Parliament. The institutional comity between the three arms of government must not be endangered by the unwarranted intrusions into the workings of one arm by another” [emphases supplied].”
70. Further, the Supreme Court, in Mate & another v Wambora & another [2017] KESC 1 (KLR) stated at paragraph 63, thus:
“From the course of reasoning emerging from such cases, it is possible to formulate certain principles, as follows:
…..
(c) the courts of law are the proper j
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A. Background
1. The Petitioner instituted the instant suit by way of a petition dated 29th April 2025 challenging the constitutionality, legality and validity of the procedures undertaken in submitting and processing of a motion dated 8th April 2025 seeking to remove her from the office of the Speaker of the 1st Respondent. She seeks to stop her removal from the office of the Speaker of the 1st Respondent. The petition is anchored on grounds in the body of the petition and supported by an affidavit sworn by the Petitioner on even date and a further affidavit dated 15th May 2025.
2. The Petitioner contends that, despite this Court issuing conservatory orders on 27th March 2025 to halt any further processing or consideration of the motion for her removal, the 4th Respondent proceeded to reproduce the same motion, and circulated it among the 5th to 37th Respondents for signatures in support and subsequently resubmitted it as a new motion dated 8th April 2025. The Petitioner asserts that the 4th Respondent, being fully aware of the conservatory orders issued by this Court, acted in contempt and in blatant disregard of those orders.
3. The Petitioner states that the 2nd Respondent, despite being fully aware of the conservatory orders issued by this Court, proceeded to receive and process the motion for her removal by serving it upon her.
4. It is the Petitioner’s case that by signing in support of and resubmitting the impugned motion dated 17th March 2025, the 3rd – 37th Respondents are attempting to circumvent court orders by reintroducing the suspended motion through the backdoor. This, she argues, amounts to a blatant act of contempt and mockery of the authority of this Court.
5. The Petitioner further asserts that the resubmission of the impugned motion constitutes an abuse of legal process and of the procedures of the 1st Respondent. She contends that it contravenes Standing Order 43(2)(b) of the 1st Respondent’s Standing Orders, which prohibits the moving of a special motion more than once within the same session.
6. It is the Petitioner’s case that the motion was irregularly received by an employee of the 1st Respondent who lacked the authority or mandate to act on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, who is by law authorized to receive such a motion and ensure determination of the admissibility under Standing Order 44(3).
7. The Petitioner swears that the resubmission of the motion by the 4th Respondent violates the rule against double jeopardy, as it would require her to defend herself against two identical motions before the 1st Respondent.
8. She further alleges that, in pursuit of their unlawful agenda to remove her from office, the 3rd, 4th 5th, and 37th Respondents physically assaulted her on 8th April 2025, the same day the impugned motion was served on the 1st Respondent. She claims that they escalated the violence by invading her office, barricading her inside, and preventing her from accessing the chambers of the 1st Respondent or conducting any lawful and constitutional business.
9. The Petitioner also contends that the signature pages of the motion dated 8th April 2025 contain material discrepancies. Specifically, that the alleged signatures of the 11th, 12th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 25th, 26th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 35th Respondents differ significantly from those in the original motion dated 17th March 2025. She further claims that the 2nd Respondent failed to authenticate the names, national identity card numbers, and signatures in the annexed list, as is standard practice, to confirm whether the motion meet the minimum threshold of support required under Section 11(3)(b) of the County Governments Act, 2012.
10. The Petitioner states that she was only served with an unauthenticated photocopy of the motion, which lacked any supporting documents or evidence for the grounds raised by the 4th Respondent. She argues that this undermines her right to a fair hearing, as it denies her the opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence presented against her. She further asserts that she has a constitutional right to access information held by the 2nd and 4th Respondents, which is necessary for her to exercise and protect her rights and fundamental freedoms from being violated. She urged that this right is guaranteed under Article 35 of the Constitution and Section 4(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act, 2016.
11. The Petitioner depones that the 3rd Respondent, who is expected to preside over the debate and voting on the impugned motion in his capacity as Deputy Speaker of the 1st Respondent pursuant to Standing Order 58(3), is openly biased against her. She claims that the 3rd Respondent is significantly conflicted and will not afford her a fair hearing, thereby violating her right to fair administrative action. Thus, she sought that the prayers outlined in the Petition be granted.
12. The Respondents oppose the petition.
B. 1st & 2nd respondents’ response
13. The 1st and 2nd Respondents oppose this petition through their reply to the petition dated 24th June 2025. The affidavit is sworn by the 2nd Respondent in his capacity as the Clerk to the 1st Respondent.
14. It is deponed that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter at this stage as the petition raises procedural issues that are best resolved by the 1st Respondent. It is argued that the Court should exercise restraint in accordance with the doctrines of separation of powers and judicial restraint. It is further sworn that granting the substantive reliefs sought by the Petitioner would undermine the authority of the 1st Respondent and violate the principle of checks and balances, which is a cornerstone of public governance.
15. The 1st and 2nd Respondents contend that granting the reliefs sought by the Petitioner would effectively shield the Petitioner from any future accountability processes initiated by the 1st Respondent, thereby promoting impunity in public service.
16. It is deponed that the 2nd Respondent, in strict compliance with the Court’s Conservatory orders, did not process or forward or submit the impugned motion to the 1st Respondent.
17. The Respondents further state that a fresh Notice of Intention to move a motion for the Petitioner’s impeachment, dated 8th April 2025, was submitted by the 4th Respondent. They argue that this is a new motion initiated by a different member of the 1st Respondent and, therefore, is not subject to the conservatory orders previously issued by the Court.
18. It is sworn that the doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply to constitutionally mandated political accountability processes, such as impeachment, and thus cannot aid a public officer to avoid legitimate political accountability mechanisms such as impeachment proceedings.
19. The 1st and 2nd Respondents maintain that there are no clear legal or constitutional infractions that would justify the Court’s intervention at this stage of the process.
20. It is further deponed that no member of the 1st Respondent has lodged any complaint regarding improper procurement or forgery of their signatures and the Petitioner’s allegations in this regard are untrue and unsubstantiated. The Respondents also deny any involvement in acts of violence, harassment, or intimidation against the Petitioner, asserting that these claims are false and not backed by credible evidence.
21. It is deponed that the 2nd Respondent served the Petitioner with a clear, legible and decipherable Notice of Motion dated 17th March 2025 as received from a member of the 1st Respondent. That the Petitioner even annexed this motion to the petition and sought further particulars in her letter dated the same day. That she did not raise concerns about the clarity of the motion at the time, making her current allegations appear unfounded and an afterthought.
22. The 1st and 2nd Respondents argue that the office of the Leader of the Majority Party is a legitimate office within the 1st Respondent, held by one of its members. Therefore, the Petitioner’s claims of a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers are unfounded.
23. It is deponed that the Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence or specific details to support her allegations of malice or bias in the processing of the impugned motion.
C. 3rd to 47th respondent’s response
24. The 4th Respondent swore an affidavit dated 8th May 2025 in opposition and in response to the petition in his capacity as a Member of the County Assembly, the Assembly’s Majority whip, Deputy Leader of the majority party of the Assembly and mover of the motion to remove the petitioner from office.
25. He depones that this petition is unmerited, in bad faith and should be dismissed in limine, at the preliminary stage. He argues that it fails to meet the threshold established in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) (1978) KLR 154 (and as emphasized in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society for Human Rights Alliance & Others (2013) eKLR). Specifically, the petition does not identify with reasonable precision the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated or threatened, nor does it provide sufficient detail on the manner of the alleged violations.
26. It is the 3rd to 47th Respondent’s position that judicial intervention can only be invoked after the County Assembly has completed its constitutional function, in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. It is deponed that both the substantive and procedural legal requirements governing the removal of a speaker have been strictly followed.
27. The 4th Respondent asserts that granting the orders sought by the Petitioner would effectively paralyze the operations of the County Assembly and hinder its constitutional mandate to oversee service delivery to the people of Machakos County.
28. He contends that the conservatory orders issued by this Court did not bar him or any other member of the County Assembly from tabling a fresh motion seeking the Petitioner’s impeachment. Therefore, he denies having acted in blatant disregard of the Court’s orders as alleged.
29. The 4th Respondent denies assaulting the Petitioner as alleged. He argues that the mere filing of a report with investigative authorities does not establish his liability. He further depones that no medical evidence, such as a doctor’s report, has been presented to confirm that the Petitioner was assaulted by individuals known to her. They urged that no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioner since impeachment is a lawful mandate of the County Assembly to be performed pursuant to the powers granted by the Constitution, the Petitioner will be granted an ample opportunity to be heard by the Assembly, and that the court will still be available at the appropriate time to interrogate compliance with the substantive and procedural law and give appropriate remedy.
D. Petitioner’s response
30. The Petitioner swore further affidavits in response to the averment by the Respondents.
31. In response to the 1st and 2nd Respondent, the petitioner depones that the fact that a different member of the 1st Respondent was the mover of the motion does not distinguish it from the original motion. She argues that both motions share the same objective and the grounds, a fact the Respondents have not denied.
32. The Petitioner further asserts that the test established in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1978] KLR 154 does not require rigid or overly formal identification of specific constitutional provisions. Instead, the test requires that the complaints in a constitutional petition be framed in a manner that gives sufficient notice of the nature of the claims, allowing the Respondents to adequately prepare their case. She relies on the decision in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 Others; Matemu (Interested Party); with Kenya Human Rights Commission & Another (Amicus Curiae) [2012] KEHC 2480 (KLR), and asserts that her petition meets this threshold.
33. The Petitioner maintains that, contrary to the Respondents’ assertion, this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in impeachment proceedings and other political processes where violations of the Constitution and other statutory requirements are demonstrated. She cites the cases of Huka & 2 others v County Assembly of Isiolo & another; Kenya Kwanza Coalition & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2023] KEHC 18212 (KLR) in support of this position.
34. She cited the case of Mwangaza v County Assembly of Meru [2025] KEHC 2059 (KLR) and argued that the court held that the Meru County Assembly acted in contempt of court by initiating a fresh impeachment motion against Governor Mwangaza despite a court order restraining such actions, and the court emphasized that circumventing judicial orders undermines the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers.
35. It is her case that contrary to the averments by the Respondents, the conservatory orders she seeks do not grant her a blanket immunity from future accountability processes. Rather, they are intended to protect her fundamental constitutional rights from being infringement or violation pending the hearing and determination of this petition.
36. In response to the 3rd to 47th Respondents, the Petitioner reiterates that this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in impeachment proceedings and other political processes where constitutional or statutory violation are established as affirmed in Huka & 2 others v County Assembly of Isiolo & another; Kenya Kwanza Coalition & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2023] KEHC 18212 (KLR).
37. It is her case that allegations by the 4th Respondent that the conservatory orders only related to the motion dated March 17, 2025 are erroneous and illogical as the resubmitted motion dated 8th April, 2025 is a replica of the original, and the court orders issued in relation to the original motion must also apply to its duplicate. Therefore, the processing of the resubmitted motion is equally subject to the conservatory orders.
E. Parties’ submissions
38. The Petition was heard by way of submissions. The Petitioner’s submissions are dated 1st July 2025; the 1st and 2nd Respondents written submissions are dated 23rd June 2025, while the 4th to 37th Respondents’ submission are dated 19th May 2025.
(a) Petitioner’s submissions
39. The Petitioner outlines the background and facts of the case and sets out six issues for determination, namely: whether the impugned motion was resubmitted in contempt of court orders, thus a nullity; whether this Court has jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs and processed of the 1st Respondent under the circumstances that gave rise to the petition herein; whether the process of initiating, filing and submissions of the impugned motion violated the Petitioner’s right under the Constitution, the County Government Act and the County Assembly of Machakos Standing Orders; whether the 3rd Respondent is suited to preside over the debate and voting of the impugned motion based on the bias and confliction he had demonstrated; whether the reliefs sought are merited and who should bear the costs of this Petition.
40. The Petitioner submitted that the motion to remove the Speaker dated 8th April 2025 is an exact replica of a previous motion dated 17th March 2025. She urged that by resubmitting this motion, the Respondents acted in blatant breach and contempt of orders issued in HCCRPET E010 of 2025 and HCCRPET E012 of 2025 that had barred them from processing the original motion, thus she asserts that the motion dated 8th April 2025 is a nullity and of no legal effect. She relies on the case of Mwangaza v County Assembly of Meru (Petition E013 of 2023)(2025)KEHC 2059 (KLR).
41. The Petitioner urged that the Court has the jurisdiction to intervene in the internal affairs of the County Assembly where there is a violation of the Constitution, disregard of court orders and where they have acted unlawfully. That the doctrine of judicial restraint and the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply in the circumstance. Reference was made to the following cases: Jayne Mati & Another v Attorney General and Another Nairobi Petition No 108 of 2011 eKLR; Huka & 2 Others v County Assembly of Isiolo & Another; Kenya Kwanza Coaliation & 2 Others (Interested Parties) (2023) KEHC 18212 KLR; Gachagua & 40 others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 others; Law Society of Kenya & 7 others (Interested Parties) (2024) KEHC 13473(KLR) to urge that the courts have the mandate to hear this dispute.
42. The Petitioner also claimed that her rights under Article 50, right to fair hearing, Article 47, Right to fair administrative action; Article 35, right to access information, were all violated. She urged that she was subjected to double jeopardy by resubmission of an identical motion while the original one was still active, pending determination.
43. In conclusion she urged the Court to find that the entire process is tainted with illegalities and procedural flaws and proceed to grant the relief sought in the petition.
(b) 1st and 2nd Respondents submissions
44. The 1st and 2nd Respondents identified two issues for determination: whether this honourable Court has jurisdiction to determine this petition, and whether the petition has merit.
45. On the first issue, it is submitted this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition at this stage while the matter is still active before the 1st Respondent in line with the doctrines of separation of powers, judicial restraint and institutional comity. That the Court must allow other arms of government to carry out their constitutional functions without undue interference. In support they cited the decisions in Nyeri Civil Application No. E093 of 2023; Hon. Kawira Mwangaza vs County Assembly of Meru and Another, Sonko v. County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 Others (Petition 11 (E008) of 2022) [2022] KESC 76 (KLR), and Charity Kaluki Ngilu v County Assembly of Kitui & 2 others [2020] eKLR.
46. It is further submitted that where it is shown that the 1st and 2nd Respondents are acting within their constitutional and statutory mandates under the Constitution and the County Governments Act, this Court should refrain from issuing injunctive relief or interfering with the process. They rely on Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another [2017] eKLR and in Gachagua v The Speaker of the National Assembly & 3 others (Petition E550 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 12876 (KLR) and by the Court of Appeal in Martin Nyaga Wambora v Speaker of the Senate & Others (2014) eKLR.
47. On the second issue, it is submitted that the petition lacks merit, and merely raises procedural concerns that should first be addressed before the 1st Respondent prior to being brought before this Court.
48. It is urged that the question of whether the motion by the 4th Respondent is in breach of existing conservatory orders, is a matter reserved for determination by the court that issued those orders.
49. Regarding the Petitioner’s allegations of bias and conflict of interest, the Respondents argue that these claims are based on mere apprehension and are not supported by any credible evidence. They point to Section 9(4) of the County Governments Act, which provides a clear remedy in such circumstances. It is contended that the Petitioner’s fears are premature and speculative since the 1st Respondent has not yet formally considered the motion.
50. It is argued that invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy to shield against an impeachment motion is misplaced. They urge the Court to exercise restraint in reviewing parliamentary procedures, particularly in matters that are still active before legislative bodies. They rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney-General & another; Law Society of Kenya & 2 others (Amicus Curiae) (Advisory Opinion Reference 2 of 2013) [2013] KESC 7 (KLR).
51. This Court is invited to reject the Petitioner’s request to scrutinize every alleged procedural irregularity and use that as a basis to quash or stay a constitutional process assigned to another arm of government. They rely on Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General & 4 Others [2013] to reinforce this position.
52. It is submitted that the Petitioner will not suffer prejudice if the legislative process is allowed to proceed. They argue that this Court retains the power to review the entire process upon its conclusion and determine its compliance with the Constitution. Where appropriate, the Court may issue orders including nullification of the process or compensation where applicable. They cite the decision in Gachagua & 40 others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 others; Law Society of Kenya & 7 others, in this regard.
(c) 3rd to 47th Respondents submissions
53. The 3rd to 47th Respondents set out the background of the dispute that led to the filing of this petition. They stated that the petition is a replica of the application and hence their response and submissions to the application be deemed as sufficient response to this Petition. They set out five issues for determination which can be summarised as: whether the petition meets the threshold for grant of the orders sought; whether the Court has jurisdiction to review a decision made by a County Assembly and whether such a review violates the doctrine of separation of powers; whether the Petitioner’s right to a fair hearing was violated; and whether the Petitioner’s action have paralyzed the operations of the Respondents.
54. They relied on the case of Gitirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others; Mrao vs First American Bank of Kenya Limited & 2 Others (2003) KLR 125; David Ndii & Others v Attorney General (2021)eKLR to submit that the Petitioner had not established a prima facie case to obtain the orders being sought. It was their submission that no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioner since impeachment is a lawful process, and that the courts will still be available at the appropriate time to interrogate compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural law.
55. They contended that the facts constituting the grounds for the removal from office met the requirements of section 11(3)(c ) and 4 of the County Government Act. They urged that the process for the impeachment of the Petitioner had commenced and had been conducted in a lawful and procedural manner by an institution mandated by law.
56. On jurisdiction it was submitted that an impeachment process is quasi-judicial in nature and that courts come in to determine the legality of the procedure. They urged that in this instance, it is premature for the Court to intervene as the impeachment process has not been finalized. They argued that the Petitioner is abusing the court process with the intention of disrupting statutory timelines and the discharge of the County Assembly functions.
57. It was stated that the Petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard and to be allowed to defend herself has not been violated in any way since the procedure for impeachment has been provided for under section 11(5)c and 7 of the County Government Act and Standing Orders which ensures that the Speaker is accorded adequate opportunity and facility to be heard. That every step so far has been done in strict compliance with the Constitution, the Standing Orders, and the County Government Act.
58. In conclusion, they urged the Court to find that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of allowing the Respondents to proceed with their lawful duties and responsibilities and in the interest of the proper functioning of the County Assembly.
F. Analysis and determination
59. After a perusal of the pleadings, the responses, affidavits, the written submissions and list and bundles of authorities herein, the first fundamental issue that emerges for determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition. The determination of this issue will determine whether this Court should delve into the merits of the petition or not.
60. Jurisdiction is the authority given to a court to hear and determine disputes before it. It is either granted by the Constitution, statute or both. If the court determines that it has no jurisdiction to hear the matter, it must down its tools. This was stipulated in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR) and the Supreme Court decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR.
61. The Petitioner contends that her constitutional and statutory right have been infringed or are threatened with violation thus bringing this matter within the jurisdiction of this court. On the other hand, the Respondents’ stand is that this Court is divested of jurisdiction to entertain this petition at this stage, by dint of the doctrines of judicial restraint, institutional comity and separation of powers.
62. The jurisdiction of this Court is provided for under Article 165 (3) of the Constitution. Pursuant to this provision, the High Court has jurisdiction, amongst others, to determine the question of whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened.
63. In addition, Article 23(1) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 165 of the Constitution, to hear and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights. Further, Article 165(6) grants the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and “over any person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.”
64. The Supreme Court is categorical, through its decisions, on when a court can intervene in a process vested in other arms of government, emphasizing on the need to exercise judicial restraint and adherent to the ripeness principle where the court only assume jurisdiction when a matter is fully ripe for the court’s intervention. In Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 others; Commission on Administrative Justice (Amicus Curiae); Law Society of Kenya (Interested Party) [2014] KEHC 7493 (KLR), the Supreme Court observed at paragraph 120, as follows:
“We fully acknowledge the need for the Court to exercise restraint in dealing with matters vested in the other arms of government by the Constitution.”
65. Further at paragraph 128, the apex Court continued thus:
“We are bolstered in this finding by the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Speaker of the Senate and Another v The Hon. Attorney General and 3 others, Advisory Opinion Reference No. 2 of 2013. In that case, the respondents had argued that pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, the Judiciary had no legitimate business to intervene in matters falling within the legislative competence of Parliament. Further, that Parliament’s business was strictly conducted within its own standing orders which are recognised by the Constitution.
129. The Court recognised the legislative authority vested in Parliament by the Constitution, and said it would be reluctant to question Parliamentary procedures or workings, as long as they did not breach the Constitution. However, where a dispute arises which alleges violation of the Constitution, then judicial intervention would not be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as the Court would merely be performing its solemn duty under the Constitution.”
66. In the instant case, the Petitioner argues that this Court has adequate jurisdiction to interfere with the impeachment proceedings and other political processes if it establishes violations of the Constitution and other statutory requirements. She claims that her right to fair hearing has been and will be grossly violated; as she was only served with an unauthenticated photocopy of the motion which did not contain any documents or evidence in support of the grounds raised by the 4th Respondent therefore, denying her the opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence produced by the 4th Respondent.
67. It is also her case that that the 3rd Respondent who is slated to preside over the debate and voting of the impugned motion in his capacity of the Deputy Speaker of the 1st Respondent in line with Standing Order 58(3) is openly biased against her, is greatly conflicted and will not accord her a fair hearing and her right to fair administrative action will be grossly violated and prejudiced.
68. The Respondents on the other hand urge that all these contentions can be canvassed and are better addressed during the impeachment process. Thus, they urge that it is premature to raise them before a court at this juncture.
69. This Court notes that the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney General & 4 others, Reference No 2 of 2013; [2013] eKLR held that it would be averse to questioning Parliamentary procedures that are formulated by the Houses to regulate their internal workings as long as the same do not breach the Constitution. The Supreme Court went on to caution against undue interference with running processes in other arms of Government. It pronounced itself at paragraph 61, thus:
“This court will not question each and every procedural infraction that may occur in either of the Houses of Parliament. The court cannot supervise the workings of Parliament. The institutional comity between the three arms of government must not be endangered by the unwarranted intrusions into the workings of one arm by another” [emphases supplied].”
70. Further, the Supreme Court, in Mate & another v Wambora & another [2017] KESC 1 (KLR) stated at paragraph 63, thus:
“From the course of reasoning emerging from such cases, it is possible to formulate certain principles, as follows:
…..
(c) the courts of law are the proper j
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