The appellants filed an application dated 4.3.24 against the respondent seeking that the court orders that the interest assessed in the decree from the date of judgment should be 6% and not 12% in line with section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act. The application was opposed by the respondent.
The learned magistrate citing the case of Kipchumba v Bog Tambach Teachers Training College (2023) KECA 802 (KAR) dismissed the application and held that the rate of interest was 12% per annum.
The appellant was dissatisfied with the ruling of the learned magistrate leading to this appeal in which the appellant contends that the learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in dismissing the application dated 4.3.25 in respect of the applicable interest rate on the decree which was silent on further interest.
The appellant submitted that the decree before the trial court was silent on further interest on the aggregate sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment and that section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act applied in the circumstance.
The appellant further submitted that the Chief Justice’s practice direction No. 1 of 1982 only guided the court’s exercise of power to order interest under section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and not the statutory provision of the rate of interest under section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act.
The appellant submitted that the trial magistrate treated the decree as one which fell under the provisions of section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and therefore acted on wrong principles. The appellant cited the case of Meridian Medical Centre Limited v National Hospital Insurance Fund (2021) KEHC 365 KLR and the case of Kevita International Company Ltd v Pacis Insurance Ltd and 3 others Civil Suit No. 2025 of 2016 (Ruling).
The respondent opposed the appeal. The respondent submitted that section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act grants courts discretion to award interest at such rates as the court deems reasonable. That the courts have settled the law that where a decree awards interest without specifying the rate, the conventional rate is 12% per annum. The respondent cited the case of Silas Obengele v Kenya Ports Authority (2004) eKLR.
The respondents’ submission is that the trial court expressly awarded interest on general damages from the date of judgment until payment in full and on special damages from the date of filing suit until payment in full without specifying the applicable rate.
The respondents submitted that the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the learned magistrate acted on wrong principles or misapprehended the law.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
The court should determine whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law by declining to reduce the rate of interest from 12% per annum to 6% per annum. The power of the court to award interest is derived from section 26 of Civil Procedure Act which provides as follows:
26(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rates as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period before the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date the court shall be deemed to have ordered interest at 6 percent per annum.
From a reading of section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act, a trial court has wide discretion to award and fix interest provided that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. In the case of Kipchumba v BOG Tambach Teachers Training College (2023) KECA 802 (KLR), the court of appeal held:
“It follows therefore, that the award of interests is a matter that is left to the discretion of the trial court, and generally, an appellate court is enjoined to treat the decision of the trial court with respect, and refrain from interfering with the decision unless it is convinced that the trial court based the award on some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong”
There is no dispute that the trial court in its judgment delivered on 24.5.2019 expressly awarded interest on general damages from the date of judgment until payment in full and on special damages from the date of filing suit until payment in full, without specifying the applicable rate.
In the case of Kipchumba v BOG Tambach Teachers Training College (supra) the court of appeal held that where the court is silent on the interest rate, the applicable rate is 12% per annum. In the matter before the trial court, there was no reason to call upon the court to consider whether the rate should be 12% or 6% as suggested by the appellant. The learned magistrate in her judgment had ordered interest to run at court rates for general damages from date of judgment and for special damages from date of filing suit and to accrue until payment in full. The judgment was not silent on payment of further interest as the operating word was ‘until payment in full’ . There was therefore no justification to invoke the provisions of section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act as the judgment itself clarified that the interest shall accrue until payment in full. The applicable interest rate as I have clarified in this case is 12% per annum.
I therefore find that the learned magistrate correctly interpreted the provisions of section 26(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act.
The upshot is that the appeal herein lacks merit and is dismissed with costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED THIS 14 th JULY 2026
D.O. ONYANGO
JUDGE.
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The learned magistrate citing the case of Kipchumba v Bog Tambach Teachers Training College (2023) KECA 802 (KAR) dismissed the application and held that the rate of interest was 12% per annum.
The appellant was dissatisfied with the ruling of the learned magistrate leading to this appeal in which the appellant contends that the learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in dismissing the application dated 4.3.25 in respect of the applicable interest rate on the decree which was silent on further interest.
The appellant submitted that the decree before the trial court was silent on further interest on the aggregate sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment and that section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act applied in the circumstance.
The appellant further submitted that the Chief Justice’s practice direction No. 1 of 1982 only guided the court’s exercise of power to order interest under section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and not the statutory provision of the rate of interest under section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act.
The appellant submitted that the trial magistrate treated the decree as one which fell under the provisions of section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and therefore acted on wrong principles. The appellant cited the case of Meridian Medical Centre Limited v National Hospital Insurance Fund (2021) KEHC 365 KLR and the case of Kevita International Company Ltd v Pacis Insurance Ltd and 3 others Civil Suit No. 2025 of 2016 (Ruling).
The respondent opposed the appeal. The respondent submitted that section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act grants courts discretion to award interest at such rates as the court deems reasonable. That the courts have settled the law that where a decree awards interest without specifying the rate, the conventional rate is 12% per annum. The respondent cited the case of Silas Obengele v Kenya Ports Authority (2004) eKLR.
The respondents’ submission is that the trial court expressly awarded interest on general damages from the date of judgment until payment in full and on special damages from the date of filing suit until payment in full without specifying the applicable rate.
The respondents submitted that the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the learned magistrate acted on wrong principles or misapprehended the law.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
The court should determine whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law by declining to reduce the rate of interest from 12% per annum to 6% per annum. The power of the court to award interest is derived from section 26 of Civil Procedure Act which provides as follows:
26(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rates as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period before the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date the court shall be deemed to have ordered interest at 6 percent per annum.
From a reading of section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act, a trial court has wide discretion to award and fix interest provided that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. In the case of Kipchumba v BOG Tambach Teachers Training College (2023) KECA 802 (KLR), the court of appeal held:
“It follows therefore, that the award of interests is a matter that is left to the discretion of the trial court, and generally, an appellate court is enjoined to treat the decision of the trial court with respect, and refrain from interfering with the decision unless it is convinced that the trial court based the award on some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong”
There is no dispute that the trial court in its judgment delivered on 24.5.2019 expressly awarded interest on general damages from the date of judgment until payment in full and on special damages from the date of filing suit until payment in full, without specifying the applicable rate.
In the case of Kipchumba v BOG Tambach Teachers Training College (supra) the court of appeal held that where the court is silent on the interest rate, the applicable rate is 12% per annum. In the matter before the trial court, there was no reason to call upon the court to consider whether the rate should be 12% or 6% as suggested by the appellant. The learned magistrate in her judgment had ordered interest to run at court rates for general damages from date of judgment and for special damages from date of filing suit and to accrue until payment in full. The judgment was not silent on payment of further interest as the operating word was ‘until payment in full’ . There was therefore no justification to invoke the provisions of section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act as the judgment itself clarified that the interest shall accrue until payment in full. The applicable interest rate as I have clarified in this case is 12% per annum.
I therefore find that the learned magistrate correctly interpreted the provisions of section 26(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act.
The upshot is that the appeal herein lacks merit and is dismissed with costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED THIS 14 th JULY 2026
D.O. ONYANGO
JUDGE.
1