1. The respondents sued the appellant in the court below, in their capacity as administrators of the estate of Barack Opiyo Njonje. In their plaint, they averred that on 12th July 2020, while the late Barrack was lawfully riding his motor cycle, registration number KMEX 281S, along Mtongwe Road, Mombasa, the appellant, or his authorised driver, agent, servant or employee, drove, managed and/or controlled a motor vehicle, registration number KAY 678Z, negligently or recklessly, causing it to ram into the deceased's motor cycle and resulting in an accident that led to the death of the deceased.
2. The respondents blamed the appellant for the accident. They sought general damages, special damages in the sum of Kes 232,300/-, costs and interest.
3. The appellant entered an appearance and filed a defence through the firm of Kimondo Gachoka & Co Advocates. The appellant denied responsibility for the accident. In the alternative, he urged that, if there was an accident, it was caused by the deceased's negligence. He prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs.
4. The matter in the court below was heard on the merits. In a judgment delivered on 5th December 2023, the Hon J Nyariki, SRM, awarded general damages amounting in aggregate to Kes 4, 412,000 made up as follows: damages for pain and suffering of Kes 50,000/-, loss of expectation of life of Kes 100,000/-, loss of dependency of Kes 4,032,000/- and special damages of KES 230,300/-.
5. The court below found the appellant and/or his driver wholly to blame for the accident. It held that the deceased earned KES 18,000, and that out of the said amount, he spent 1/3 on himself while 2/3 went to his dependents. Noting that he was 22 at the time of his death, the court held that, given the circumstances and the vagaries of life it was reasonable to expect that he would have worked for 28 years, which on the basis of the calculation 28 (years) x 12 (months) x Kes 18,000/- (per month) x 2/3 (multiplicand) amounted to Kes 4,032, 000/-.
6. The court, while noting that the deceased died on the same, awarded Kes 50,000/- to the Respondent based on its analysis of comparable awards. The respondents were awarded Kes 100,000/- for loss of expectation of life. The court awarded the respondents Kes 230,300/- on account of the special damages.
7. The appellant was aggrieved by the said decision and appealed to this court. In the Memorandum of Appeal dated 20th January 2024, the appellant raised 11 grounds of appeal, to wit:-
1. The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the applicant's submissions on both points of law and facts.
2. That the learned magistrate’s decision was unjust, against the weight of evidence and was based on misguided points of fact and wrong principles of law and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
3. That the learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in The Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013, CAP 405.
4. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding the Appellant 100% liable in view of the evidence produced before the trial court and in particular the following:
a) That the Respondent failed to prove his case on liability against the Appellant.
5. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding the estate of the deceased a sum of Kshs.50,000/- as for pain and suffering while not considering the deceased passed on the same day.
6. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding the estate of the deceased a sum for loss of expectation of life when it was not entitled to the same and/or the same was so excessive as to amount to an erroneous estimate of loss or damage suffered by the estate of the deceased.
7. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding the estate of the deceased a sum of Kshs.4,032,000/- for loss of dependency that was so excessive as to amount to an erroneous estimate of loss or damage suffered by the estate of the deceased.
8. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in using the ratio 2/3 in computation of the loss of dependency.
9. The learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider the Appellants’ submissions on quantum and liability and the legal authorities relied upon in support thereof.
10. The learned magistrate erred in fact and law by overly relying on the respondents’ submissions, which were not relevant, and without addressing his mind to the circumstances of the case.
11. The learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider conventional award in cases of similar nature.
8. The appellant seeks to set aside the judgment of the Hon Joshua Nyariki and to have the suit in the court below dismissed with costs. In the alternative, the appellant seeks reassessment of the apportionments in respect of pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life and loss of dependency, by reducing the same, and for the costs in the appeal.
9. The appeal was canvassed through written submissions. I shall set out each party's submissions below.
10. The appellant’s submissions are dated 3rd April 2025. The appellant’s counsel condensed the grounds of appeal to one: what was the appropriate quantum of damages. It was contended that the dependency ratio of 2/3 for the 22-year-old man, who was survived by a father and a mother and had no children, was excessive. It was urged that the court ought to have used a ratio of 1/3. Reliance was placed on the cases of Petronila Muli v Richard Muindi Savi & Catherine Mwende Mwindu [2021] KEHC 6932 (KLR), Dismas Muhami Wainarua v Sopon Kasirimo Maranta (suing as administrator and or personal representative of the estate of Partinini Supon (Deceased) [2021] KEHC 8500 (KLR), and Rodgers Kinoti v Linus Bundi Murithi & another [2022] KEHC 1784 (KLR).
11. The appellant’s counsel submitted that the court below used the wrong multiplicand. It contended that the pay of Kes 18,000/- was subject to statutory deductions, which would have reduced the deceased’s salary to Kes 15,000/-, resulting in the amount due to the deceased's estate for loss of dependency being 28 (years) x 12 (months) x Kes 15,000 (per month) x 1/3 = Kes 1,680,000/-. The appellant therefore prayed that judgment be entered for Kes 1,869,000/-, which amount is the sum of the awards in respect of all heads of claim. Regarding costs, it was urged that costs follow the event. Accordingly, it was prayed that the appellant be awarded costs of the appeal.
12. On its part, the respondent prayed in the submissions dated 16th April 2025 that the appeal be dismissed with costs and that the entire judgment of the court below be upheld.
13. In the said submissions the respondent contended that there were 3 issues for determination by the Court, to wit:-
i Whether the trial court considered the submissions of both parties in reaching its decisions;
ii Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellant 100% to blame for the accident; and
iii Whether the trial court erred in making the award under the Fatal Accidents Act and Law Reform Act.
14. On the first issue, the respondent’s counsel, while denying that the court did not consider the submissions of the appellant, contended, relying on the case of Moi v Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 642 (KLR), that submissions are not evidence.
15. It was contended that the respondent’s evidence on liability was uncontroverted. The court was therefore urged not to disturb the finding on that point.
16. On the quantum of damages, it was contended that this court may only interfere with the quantum of damages where the damages awarded were:
i Inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate;
ii Based on a wrong principle of law;
iii Made without consideration of relevant factors.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that none of the grounds were applicable in the circumstances of this case.
17. It was urged that the deceased earned Kes 18,000/-. The court was asked to consider the letter on page 28 of the Record of Appeal. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the deceased’s unmarried status did not preclude him from supporting his family. Counsel prayed that the court retain the dependency ratio of 2/3 and that a multiplier of 28 years was reasonable and consistent with the decision of the court in Board of Governors of Kangubiri Girls High School & another v Jane Wanjiku Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 224 (KLR). It was urged that the court be pleased not to disturb the finding of the court below.
18. It was thus prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs to the respondent.
19. I have perused the record of appeal, the documents therein, as well as the submissions and the authorities filed in support of or against the appeal. I note that this is the first appeal. The duty of the first appellant court is to reevaluate and reassess the evidence and draw my own conclusion. I must, however, keep at the back of my mind that this court, unlike the trial court, did not have the advantage of hearing the evidence first hand or observing the demeanour of the witness and must make due allowance.
20. The duty of the first appellate court was defined authoritatively in the case of Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company & Others (1968) EA 123, where it was held that:-
“This Court must consider the evidence, reevaluate it itself and draw its own conclusion, though in doing so, it should always bear in mind that it neither heard witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. However, this Court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he had clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities, materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally”
21. Similarly, in the case of Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1985] EA 424, the court held that:-
“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the findings on a question of fact, of the judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses… But the jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution: it is not enough that the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion…”
22. Since the appeal is partly grounded on a grievance against the quantum of damages, which decision was grounded upon an exercise of judicial discretion, I will state the law regarding review of a decision of an inferior court in such matters. In Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA93 it was held that:-
“That this court will not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters it should not have acted on or because it has failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion.”
23. In this appeal, the main issue, as far as I can tell, is the quantum of damages. I note at the outset that the appellant did not call any witnesses. The evidence of the respondents was therefore not controverted. In the circumstances, I am unable to disturb the finding of the learned magistrate that the appellant was wholly to blame for the accident. I agree with the counsel for the respondents that submissions, however glossy they may be, are not evidence.
24. It is a common ground that the deceased was 22 years old. He worked at Jesus Celebration Centre as a sound technician. According to the letter of appointment dated 1st December 2018 the deceased earned a gross pay of Kes 18,000/-. The said letter expressly indicated that the pay was subject to statutory deductions in respect of PAYE, NSSF and NHIF. What then is the right multiplicand? Is it the gross salary of Kes 18,000/-, or the said amount net of deductions?
25. The Court of Appeal in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja (Deceased) v Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited [2015] KECA 318 (KLR) stated that:-
“As emphasized above, the net income determines the multiplicand, and it is only net of statutory deductions. In this case, Hellen testified, and it is apparent from the pay-slip, that the net salary after statutory deductions was Sh. 19,373, and indeed counsel for KSSL accepted that figure in his submissions. There is no reason why the High Court should have interfered with that figure.”
26. The respondents did not provide any pay slip. I, however, note that the NSSF deduction in 2018 was Kes 200, while NHIF was Kes 600. PAYE, on the other hand, was Kes 647/10. Thus, total deductions were Kes 1447/10 leaving a net balance of Kes 16,552/90. This latter amount was the multiplicand which the court below ought to have used.
27. There is consensus that it was reasonable for the court below to apply a multiplier of 28 years, as the deceased was 22 years old at the time of his untimely demise. There is therefore no basis to disturb that finding.
28. The contentious point is the dependency ratio. The respondents maintain that the court was right to use 2/3. On the other hand, the appellant avers that 1/3 was the right ratio.
29. It was contended that the deceased, though unmarried, took care of his parents and paid school fees for his siblings. The dependency ratio is a matter of fact that depends on the evidence. In the case of Dismas Muhami Wainarua v Sopon Kasirimo Maranta (suing as administrator and or personal representative of the estate of Partinini Supon (Deceased) [2021] KEHC 8500 (KLR) it was held that:-
“43. Dependency is a fact that should be proved by evidence. The respondent stated that the deceased used to give them Kes 10,000 while he stated in his statement that the deceased spent two-thirds of his income to support them. Obviously, the respondent did not understand what was meant by two-thirds of the deceased’s income. That notwithstanding, the ages of his siblings were not given to show that they depended on the deceased in any way. There was need to prove through evidence, that the deceased’s brothers and sister were his dependants which the respondent did not do.
44. The deceased left behind parents. He must have supported them in some way. In that regard the ratio could not have been 2/3. The respondent’s counsel agreed that the dependency ratio of 2/3 was on the higher side and suggested a ratio of ½. Although the deceased was not married, it would be difficult to assume without evidence that he gave ½ of his income towards his parents’ support. The ratio of 1/3 would be appropriate.”
30. In this particular case it would appear to me that support for his parents and siblings was well attested. Having so said, the idea that he would spend 2/3 of his income on his parents and siblings and only 1/3 on himself would seem to be far-fetched. I am inclined to find that ½ of his salary would have supported his family. I therefore find and hold that the dependency ratio was ½, rather than 2/3, as the learned magistrate stated.
31. Based on the foregoing, the award for loss of dependency would be reckoned as follows: Kes 16,552.90 (multiplicand) x12 (months) x 28 (multiplier) x ½ (dependency ratio) = Kes 2,780,887.20.
32. I am not persuaded that the court erred in assessing damages for pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life and special damages. In the circumstances, I won’t disturb the court’s findings in those respects.
33. The appeal succeeds in part. I set aside the judgment of the court below. I award the Respondents Kes 3,161,187/20 made up as follows:-
1. Kes 50,000/- for pain and suffering.
2. Kes 100,000/- for loss of expectation
3. Kes 230,300/- for special damages
4. Kes 2,780,887/20 for loss of dependency
Total Amount - Kes.3,161,187/20
34. I award the respondent half the costs in the appeal and the costs in the court below. The award shall attract interest at court rate from the date of judgment in the trial court until payment in full.
35. It is so ordered.
Dated and signed in Nairobi this 27th day of July 2026.
2. The respondents blamed the appellant for the accident. They sought general damages, special damages in the sum of Kes 232,300/-, costs and interest.
3. The appellant entered an appearance and filed a defence through the firm of Kimondo Gachoka & Co Advocates. The appellant denied responsibility for the accident. In the alternative, he urged that, if there was an accident, it was caused by the deceased's negligence. He prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs.
4. The matter in the court below was heard on the merits. In a judgment delivered on 5th December 2023, the Hon J Nyariki, SRM, awarded general damages amounting in aggregate to Kes 4, 412,000 made up as follows: damages for pain and suffering of Kes 50,000/-, loss of expectation of life of Kes 100,000/-, loss of dependency of Kes 4,032,000/- and special damages of KES 230,300/-.
5. The court below found the appellant and/or his driver wholly to blame for the accident. It held that the deceased earned KES 18,000, and that out of the said amount, he spent 1/3 on himself while 2/3 went to his dependents. Noting that he was 22 at the time of his death, the court held that, given the circumstances and the vagaries of life it was reasonable to expect that he would have worked for 28 years, which on the basis of the calculation 28 (years) x 12 (months) x Kes 18,000/- (per month) x 2/3 (multiplicand) amounted to Kes 4,032, 000/-.
6. The court, while noting that the deceased died on the same, awarded Kes 50,000/- to the Respondent based on its analysis of comparable awards. The respondents were awarded Kes 100,000/- for loss of expectation of life. The court awarded the respondents Kes 230,300/- on account of the special damages.
7. The appellant was aggrieved by the said decision and appealed to this court. In the Memorandum of Appeal dated 20th January 2024, the appellant raised 11 grounds of appeal, to wit:-
1. The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the applicant's submissions on both points of law and facts.
2. That the learned magistrate’s decision was unjust, against the weight of evidence and was based on misguided points of fact and wrong principles of law and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
3. That the learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in The Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013, CAP 405.
4. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding the Appellant 100% liable in view of the evidence produced before the trial court and in particular the following:
a) That the Respondent failed to prove his case on liability against the Appellant.
5. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding the estate of the deceased a sum of Kshs.50,000/- as for pain and suffering while not considering the deceased passed on the same day.
6. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding the estate of the deceased a sum for loss of expectation of life when it was not entitled to the same and/or the same was so excessive as to amount to an erroneous estimate of loss or damage suffered by the estate of the deceased.
7. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding the estate of the deceased a sum of Kshs.4,032,000/- for loss of dependency that was so excessive as to amount to an erroneous estimate of loss or damage suffered by the estate of the deceased.
8. The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in using the ratio 2/3 in computation of the loss of dependency.
9. The learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider the Appellants’ submissions on quantum and liability and the legal authorities relied upon in support thereof.
10. The learned magistrate erred in fact and law by overly relying on the respondents’ submissions, which were not relevant, and without addressing his mind to the circumstances of the case.
11. The learned magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider conventional award in cases of similar nature.
8. The appellant seeks to set aside the judgment of the Hon Joshua Nyariki and to have the suit in the court below dismissed with costs. In the alternative, the appellant seeks reassessment of the apportionments in respect of pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life and loss of dependency, by reducing the same, and for the costs in the appeal.
9. The appeal was canvassed through written submissions. I shall set out each party's submissions below.
10. The appellant’s submissions are dated 3rd April 2025. The appellant’s counsel condensed the grounds of appeal to one: what was the appropriate quantum of damages. It was contended that the dependency ratio of 2/3 for the 22-year-old man, who was survived by a father and a mother and had no children, was excessive. It was urged that the court ought to have used a ratio of 1/3. Reliance was placed on the cases of Petronila Muli v Richard Muindi Savi & Catherine Mwende Mwindu [2021] KEHC 6932 (KLR), Dismas Muhami Wainarua v Sopon Kasirimo Maranta (suing as administrator and or personal representative of the estate of Partinini Supon (Deceased) [2021] KEHC 8500 (KLR), and Rodgers Kinoti v Linus Bundi Murithi & another [2022] KEHC 1784 (KLR).
11. The appellant’s counsel submitted that the court below used the wrong multiplicand. It contended that the pay of Kes 18,000/- was subject to statutory deductions, which would have reduced the deceased’s salary to Kes 15,000/-, resulting in the amount due to the deceased's estate for loss of dependency being 28 (years) x 12 (months) x Kes 15,000 (per month) x 1/3 = Kes 1,680,000/-. The appellant therefore prayed that judgment be entered for Kes 1,869,000/-, which amount is the sum of the awards in respect of all heads of claim. Regarding costs, it was urged that costs follow the event. Accordingly, it was prayed that the appellant be awarded costs of the appeal.
12. On its part, the respondent prayed in the submissions dated 16th April 2025 that the appeal be dismissed with costs and that the entire judgment of the court below be upheld.
13. In the said submissions the respondent contended that there were 3 issues for determination by the Court, to wit:-
i Whether the trial court considered the submissions of both parties in reaching its decisions;
ii Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellant 100% to blame for the accident; and
iii Whether the trial court erred in making the award under the Fatal Accidents Act and Law Reform Act.
14. On the first issue, the respondent’s counsel, while denying that the court did not consider the submissions of the appellant, contended, relying on the case of Moi v Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 642 (KLR), that submissions are not evidence.
15. It was contended that the respondent’s evidence on liability was uncontroverted. The court was therefore urged not to disturb the finding on that point.
16. On the quantum of damages, it was contended that this court may only interfere with the quantum of damages where the damages awarded were:
i Inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate;
ii Based on a wrong principle of law;
iii Made without consideration of relevant factors.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that none of the grounds were applicable in the circumstances of this case.
17. It was urged that the deceased earned Kes 18,000/-. The court was asked to consider the letter on page 28 of the Record of Appeal. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the deceased’s unmarried status did not preclude him from supporting his family. Counsel prayed that the court retain the dependency ratio of 2/3 and that a multiplier of 28 years was reasonable and consistent with the decision of the court in Board of Governors of Kangubiri Girls High School & another v Jane Wanjiku Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 224 (KLR). It was urged that the court be pleased not to disturb the finding of the court below.
18. It was thus prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs to the respondent.
19. I have perused the record of appeal, the documents therein, as well as the submissions and the authorities filed in support of or against the appeal. I note that this is the first appeal. The duty of the first appellant court is to reevaluate and reassess the evidence and draw my own conclusion. I must, however, keep at the back of my mind that this court, unlike the trial court, did not have the advantage of hearing the evidence first hand or observing the demeanour of the witness and must make due allowance.
20. The duty of the first appellate court was defined authoritatively in the case of Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company & Others (1968) EA 123, where it was held that:-
“This Court must consider the evidence, reevaluate it itself and draw its own conclusion, though in doing so, it should always bear in mind that it neither heard witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. However, this Court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he had clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities, materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally”
21. Similarly, in the case of Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1985] EA 424, the court held that:-
“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the findings on a question of fact, of the judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses… But the jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution: it is not enough that the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion…”
22. Since the appeal is partly grounded on a grievance against the quantum of damages, which decision was grounded upon an exercise of judicial discretion, I will state the law regarding review of a decision of an inferior court in such matters. In Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA93 it was held that:-
“That this court will not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters it should not have acted on or because it has failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion.”
23. In this appeal, the main issue, as far as I can tell, is the quantum of damages. I note at the outset that the appellant did not call any witnesses. The evidence of the respondents was therefore not controverted. In the circumstances, I am unable to disturb the finding of the learned magistrate that the appellant was wholly to blame for the accident. I agree with the counsel for the respondents that submissions, however glossy they may be, are not evidence.
24. It is a common ground that the deceased was 22 years old. He worked at Jesus Celebration Centre as a sound technician. According to the letter of appointment dated 1st December 2018 the deceased earned a gross pay of Kes 18,000/-. The said letter expressly indicated that the pay was subject to statutory deductions in respect of PAYE, NSSF and NHIF. What then is the right multiplicand? Is it the gross salary of Kes 18,000/-, or the said amount net of deductions?
25. The Court of Appeal in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja (Deceased) v Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited [2015] KECA 318 (KLR) stated that:-
“As emphasized above, the net income determines the multiplicand, and it is only net of statutory deductions. In this case, Hellen testified, and it is apparent from the pay-slip, that the net salary after statutory deductions was Sh. 19,373, and indeed counsel for KSSL accepted that figure in his submissions. There is no reason why the High Court should have interfered with that figure.”
26. The respondents did not provide any pay slip. I, however, note that the NSSF deduction in 2018 was Kes 200, while NHIF was Kes 600. PAYE, on the other hand, was Kes 647/10. Thus, total deductions were Kes 1447/10 leaving a net balance of Kes 16,552/90. This latter amount was the multiplicand which the court below ought to have used.
27. There is consensus that it was reasonable for the court below to apply a multiplier of 28 years, as the deceased was 22 years old at the time of his untimely demise. There is therefore no basis to disturb that finding.
28. The contentious point is the dependency ratio. The respondents maintain that the court was right to use 2/3. On the other hand, the appellant avers that 1/3 was the right ratio.
29. It was contended that the deceased, though unmarried, took care of his parents and paid school fees for his siblings. The dependency ratio is a matter of fact that depends on the evidence. In the case of Dismas Muhami Wainarua v Sopon Kasirimo Maranta (suing as administrator and or personal representative of the estate of Partinini Supon (Deceased) [2021] KEHC 8500 (KLR) it was held that:-
“43. Dependency is a fact that should be proved by evidence. The respondent stated that the deceased used to give them Kes 10,000 while he stated in his statement that the deceased spent two-thirds of his income to support them. Obviously, the respondent did not understand what was meant by two-thirds of the deceased’s income. That notwithstanding, the ages of his siblings were not given to show that they depended on the deceased in any way. There was need to prove through evidence, that the deceased’s brothers and sister were his dependants which the respondent did not do.
44. The deceased left behind parents. He must have supported them in some way. In that regard the ratio could not have been 2/3. The respondent’s counsel agreed that the dependency ratio of 2/3 was on the higher side and suggested a ratio of ½. Although the deceased was not married, it would be difficult to assume without evidence that he gave ½ of his income towards his parents’ support. The ratio of 1/3 would be appropriate.”
30. In this particular case it would appear to me that support for his parents and siblings was well attested. Having so said, the idea that he would spend 2/3 of his income on his parents and siblings and only 1/3 on himself would seem to be far-fetched. I am inclined to find that ½ of his salary would have supported his family. I therefore find and hold that the dependency ratio was ½, rather than 2/3, as the learned magistrate stated.
31. Based on the foregoing, the award for loss of dependency would be reckoned as follows: Kes 16,552.90 (multiplicand) x12 (months) x 28 (multiplier) x ½ (dependency ratio) = Kes 2,780,887.20.
32. I am not persuaded that the court erred in assessing damages for pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life and special damages. In the circumstances, I won’t disturb the court’s findings in those respects.
33. The appeal succeeds in part. I set aside the judgment of the court below. I award the Respondents Kes 3,161,187/20 made up as follows:-
1. Kes 50,000/- for pain and suffering.
2. Kes 100,000/- for loss of expectation
3. Kes 230,300/- for special damages
4. Kes 2,780,887/20 for loss of dependency
Total Amount - Kes.3,161,187/20
34. I award the respondent half the costs in the appeal and the costs in the court below. The award shall attract interest at court rate from the date of judgment in the trial court until payment in full.
35. It is so ordered.
Dated and signed in Nairobi this 27th day of July 2026.