ABDULRAHMAN ERIAH WAMALA VS County Secretary Turkana

1. Abdulrahman Eriah Wamala (the Plaintiff) sued the Defendants through a plaint dated 13th December 2019 seeking the following reliefs:
a) An order that he is the legal Beneficial owner of Plot No. 817 measuring 0.0580 Ha or thereabout situated within Lodwar Town.
b) An order that the demolition of Plot No. 817 measuring 0.0580 Ha or thereabouts situated in Lodwar town on 29th November 2018 by the Defendants jointly or severally was unprocedural, malicious and illegal.
c) Compensatory damages on the basis of full repayment value of the suit property valued at Kshs 49,080,000/= as per the valuation report by M/s Tuliflocks Ltd on 27th August 2017.
d) Loss of future earnings or rental income from the suit property at the rate of Kshs 280,750/= per month for the remainder of the period of his leasehold interest of 96 years from the time of demolition of the suit property on 29th November 2018 until the date of Judgment translating to Kshs 323,424,000/=.
e) In the alternative to d, that he is entitled to monthly rental income of Kshs 280,000/= from the date of demolition on 29th January 2018 to the date of delivery of judgment
f) Aggravated and Exemplary damages
g) Interest on c and d above from the date of filing this suit at commercial rates until payment in full.
h) Costs of the suit.
2. The Plaintiff’s case was that he was allotted Plot No. 817, measuring 0.0580 hectares within Lodwar Town, through Allotment Letter No. 1096 issued by the defunct Lodwar Municipal Council. Upon paying the requisite allotment fees, he obtained approvals to construct a commercial building, which he named ‘Kapedo Center’. He contended that he subsequently leased out the premises, earning an average monthly rent of Kshs 280,750/=.
3. He further stated that on 18th October 2015, enforcement officers (askaris) from the 1st Defendant descended on the suit property and partially demolished it, claiming it had been constructed on land designated as a recreational park. Despite making efforts to clarify the issue with the 1st Defendant, he was shuffled between offices without resolution, prompting him to seek redress in court. He averred that notwithstanding injunctive orders issued on 23rd October 2015 restraining further demolition, the 1st Defendant proceeded to fully demolish the structures on the suit property, occasioning him substantial financial loss.
4. In response, the Defendants filed a joint statement of defence and counterclaim dated 5th February 2020, denying the existence of the suit property. They alleged that the allotment letter was a forgery, fraudulently obtained in collusion with former officials of the defunct local authority. The Defendants asserted that, in their capacity as custodians of public land, they were constitutionally mandated to repossess any land acquired unlawfully. On that basis, they counterclaimed for the recovery of rental income earned by the Plaintiff during the period of alleged illegal occupation and trespass.
5. In reply, the Plaintiff maintained that the suit property was not a recreation park. He pointed out that neighbouring commercial plots were not subjected to demolition, suggesting that the actions against him were malicious. He contended that the demolition executed in defiance of a valid court order was irregular and unlawful. He further argued that it was unreasonable to designate his small parcel of 0.0580 hectares as a recreational park when vast tracts of idle land existed within Lodwar Town.
EVIDENCE
6. To support his claim, the Plaintiff called two witnesses. Testifying as PW1, he stated that he is a businessman based in Lodwar town. He was allocated the suit land in or around April 2012. He produced the allotment letter dated 20th April 2012 as PEXH 1. He explained that the allotment was conditional on development, which he undertook after paying the necessary fees. He produced a letter dated 15th June 2012 addressed to the District Commissioner, Town Clerk, District Surveyor, and Public Health Officer as PEXH 2, along with letters of no objection dated 21st June 2012 and 7th July 2012 as PEXH 3 and 4, respectively. Pursuant to these approvals, he constructed 23 rental shops on the land, having obtained further authorization from the Physical Planning Officer and District Officer. He also produced a development letter (PEXH 5), proposed plans (PEXH 6), and additional correspondence (PEXH 7). According to PW1, the property was valued at Kshs 49,080,000/= and generated Kshs 280,000/= in monthly rent. He insisted that the 1st Defendant demolished the property in defiance of injunctive orders in Lodwar PMCC No. 7 of 2015. He further testified that the demolition was conducted without notice and that the land was not classified as public land at the time of allocation. He also stated that no title deeds had been issued for land in Turkana and that his request for ownership documentation had gone unanswered.
7. PW1 further testified that he received a notice dated 28th October 2015 referring to resolutions made in 1992 about the land being a recreational park, yet his allocation occurred in 2012. He asserted that the 1st Defendant had previously acknowledged his ownership in Kitale ELC No. 48 of 2019, where he was listed as an allottee in paragraph 3 of the defence. To further support his claim, he produced a survey plan, photographs, tenancy agreements, bank statements, deposit slips, a valuation report dated 23rd August 2017, and additional documents marked PEXH 8–23.
8. PW2, David Kariuki, a land valuer, testified that he prepared the valuation report produced as PEXH 11 after inspecting the buildings erected on the suit property. He confirmed that the market value of the land and developments thereon was Kshs 49,080,000/=.
9. At this point the Plaintiff’s closed his case.
10. The first Defence witness, DW1, was Joseph Egiron. He was the Turkana County Director of Urban Areas Management. He testified that the suit property had been earmarked as a recreational park. He found it inconceivable that the Plaintiff could have been allotted the property on 20th April 2012, twenty years after a resolution passed on 23rd September 1992. He testified further that upon discovering the Plaintiff’s construction activities, the County issued a demolition notice at his cost, which was ignored.
11. He testified further that given the Plaintiff’s birthdate of 6th November 1975, he could not have been allocated the land in 1992 at age 17. He insisted that the allotment was fraudulently obtained. DW1 produced various documents including the Integrated Urban Development Plan for Lodwar (DEXH 1), Notice of Completion of Development Plans (DEXH 2), a tender award notification and acceptance letter to Salama Enterprises (DEXH 3 & 4), a Local Purchase Order (DEXH 5), and a letter dated 28th October 2015 from the County addressed to the Plaintiff (DEXH 6).
12. DW2, Kevin Onyango Obota, a surveyor employed by the 1st Defendant, corroborated DW1’s testimony. He stated that the suit land, along with adjacent plots, had been designated for use as a recreational park as shown in the cadastral plan.
13. At this juncture the Defendants’ closed their case. The parties filed written submissions.
PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSONS
14. Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the suit was properly instituted and not time-barred, as alleged by the Defendants. It was contended that the cause of action arose from a continuing trespass and unlawful occupation of the Plaintiff’s land by the Defendants, which is exempt from the limitations under Section 3(1) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act by virtue of Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of Stephen Karanja Chege v Rural Electrification Authority (Thika ELC Case No. 869 of 2017) and NGURUMAN LIMITED v SHOMPOLE GROUP RANCH & 3 OTHERS [2007] KECA 398 (KLR) to argue that every continuance of a trespass constitutes a fresh cause of action.
15. On the question of ownership, counsel maintained that the Plaintiff was lawfully allotted Plot No. 817 in Lodwar town by the defunct Municipal Council of Lodwar on 20th April 2012. It was submitted that the Plaintiff applied for the plot, paid requisite fees, received a letter of allotment, and obtained necessary approvals for development. Counsel emphasized that the reference to 1992 in the allotment letter merely reflected the original committee resolution for commercial plot allocation and did not imply that the Plaintiff's individual allotment occurred in that year. The Plaintiff’s development of the plot into a commercial complex with 23 shops was said to be evidence of his legitimate interest and occupation.
16. The Plaintiff further submitted that due to the demolition of the said property by the Defendants, while he was abroad for medical treatment, he suffered substantial loss and damage. Counsel emphasized that the demolition was effected despite the existence of injunctive orders issued on 23rd October 2015 in Lodwar PMCC No. 7 of 2015, which had restrained the Defendants from interfering with the suit property. The Defendants’ application to set aside those orders, and to transfer the matter to Kitale ELC Court, was dismissed by Hon. Justice Mwangi Njoroge on 14th November 2018.
17. Regarding the nature of Plot No. 817, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the plot was designated as a recreational park. They argued that no evidence was presented of any formal resolution by the defunct Municipal Council setting the land aside for public use. Counsel further submitted that the Integrated Strategic Urban Development Plan for Lodwar Town (2011–2030), relied upon by the Defendants, was approved after the Plaintiff’s allotment and did not in itself confer ownership rights. It was argued that any plan purporting to affect private rights could not be enforced retrospectively or in violation of due process.
18. The Plaintiff impugned the expert evidence adduced by the Defence, particularly the google map presentations and cadastral data, asserting that they were contradictory, lacking in probative value, and inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s documentary evidence, including valuation reports. It was noted that while Defence witnesses claimed the land was public or reserved for housing, no supporting documentation or gazetted notifications were produced.
19. On the issue of unlawful acquisition, the Plaintiff maintained that the Defendants failed to prove any fraud or illegality in the Plaintiff's acquisition of the plot. It was submitted that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, as held in Ratlal Gordhanbhai Patel v Lalji Makanji (1956) and followed in Nairobi ELC No. 1303 of 2014 Mike Maina Kamau v Attorney General. The Plaintiff argued that no evidence was presented to establish the alleged fraudulent collusion with local government officials.
20. Finally, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants’ counterclaim was without merit, unsupported by evidence, and should be dismissed with costs. The Plaintiff asked the Court to award him the costs of both the suit and counterclaim.
DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS
21. Learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any lawful ownership or entitlement to Plot No. 817 in Lodwar town. It was contended that the Plaintiff’s claim, based solely on a letter of allotment allegedly issued on 20th April 2012 by the defunct Municipal Council of Lodwar, lacked legal foundation and did not confer any proprietary interest capable of protection under law.
22. The Defendants asserted that the suit land was non-existent in the official register as a private plot and was, in fact, public land reserved for the development of the Lodwar Recreation Park. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had obtained the allotment letter through fraud, misrepresentation, and collusion with former officials of the defunct local authority just prior to the transition to county governments. Several particulars of fraud were enumerated, including the rushed approvals issued in five days without public participation, approvals granted by officials who no longer had legal mandate post-promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, and the Plaintiff’s failure to provide a Part Development Plan (PDP) or any proof of gazettement or auction as required under the repealed Government Lands Act.
23. It was argued that the Plaintiff's reliance on an allotment letter without attaching a PDP, and without proof of compliance with the terms of the allotment (such as payment of stand premium and ground rent), rendered his claim fatally defective. The Defence cited several decisions, including Mako Abdi Doi-al v Ali Duane & 2 Others (2019)eKLR and Nelson Kazungu Chai & 9 Others v Pwani University College (2014)eKLR, to reinforce the proposition that an allotment letter without the requisite compliance and accompanying documents does not confer any interest in land.
24. On the issue of jurisdiction and limitation, it was submitted that the Plaintiff’s suit, having been filed more than twelve months after the alleged demolition of 29th January 2018, was time-barred under Section 3(1) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act, and should be struck out in limine. Counsel rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that trespass was a continuing tort, arguing instead that the claim was rooted in a one-off act of demolition and compensation, not in ongoing occupation.
25. Further, the Defendants contended that there was no valid or enforceable court order restraining the demolition of the structures on the disputed land. The earlier suit in PMCC No. 7 of 2015 at Lodwar, which had allegedly resulted in injunctive orders, had been withdrawn, and no valid order remained in force at the material time.
26. With respect to damages, counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to tender any credible or legally admissible proof of the value of the demolished property or any monthly rental income. The valuation produced by the Plaintiff, it was argued, had merely extrapolated figures from claimed rental income and multiplied it by ten to reach a speculative valuation of Kshs. 49,080,000. The Plaintiff had failed to produce architectural drawings, construction approvals, building plans, or occupancy permits.
27. Moreover, the Defendants submitted that the Integrated Strategic Urban Development Plan for Lodwar (2011–2030), adopted by the County Assembly in 2015 after public participation, clearly earmarked the area encompassing Plot No. 817 as a green area reserved for recreation. Technical evidence, including geospatial data and cadastral maps, had been produced in support of this claim. It was maintained that any alienation of such land without consultation with or approval by the National Land Commission as required under Article 62 of the Constitution was unconstitutional and void ab initio.
28. On the issue of the Defendants’ counterclaim, it was submitted that the Plaintiff had by his own admission developed a commercial building on public land and collected rental income therefrom. This, the Defendants argued, constituted illegal enrichment from mesne profits obtained through encroachment on land meant for public use. As such, it was prayed that the Plaintiff be ordered to refund all rental income collected during the period of alleged illegal occupation.
29. In conclusion, counsel for the Defendants urged the Court to find that: The Plaintiff had not established lawful ownership or interest in the suit land; The Plaintiff’s suit was time-barred and otherwise incompetent; The Plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation or damages; The Defendants were entitled to recover from the Plaintiff the rental income obtained unlawfully; and the entire suit be dismissed with costs to the Defendants.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
30. Having carefully considered the pleadings, evidence, and rival submissions by both parties, the following issues arise for determination:
a) Whether the Plaintiff lawfully acquired and held proprietary interest in Plot No. 817 situated in Lodwar Town;
b) Whether the demolition of the Plaintiff’s premises on 29th November 2018 was illegal and/or unlawful;
c) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought;
d) Whether the Plaintiff’s suit is time-barred under the Public Authorities Limitation Act;
e) Whether the Defendants’ counterclaim for mesne profits is merited
31. This Court now proceeds to determine the issues sequentially.
a) Whether the Plaintiff lawfully acquired Plot No. 817 in Lodwar
32. The Plaintiff's claim is premised on a letter of allotment issued on 20th April 2012 by the defunct Municipal Council of Lodwar. It is trite law that a letter of allotment per se does not confer absolute ownership of land. In Wreck Motors Enterprises v The Commissioner of Lands & 3 others [1997] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:
“A letter of allotment is nothing more than an invitation to treat; a step in the process of allocation. It does not constitute title to land unless followed by compliance with all conditions, including payment of requisite fees and issuance of a title document.”
33. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kenya, in Torino Enterprises Limited v Attorney General (Petition 5 (E006) of 2022) [2023] KESC 79 (KLR) (22 September 2023) (Judgment) held,
“So, can an allotment letter pass good title? It is settled law that an allotment letter is incapable of conferring interest in land, being nothing more than an offer, awaiting the fulfilment of conditions stipulated therein….
Suffice it to say that an Allottee, in whose name the allotment letter is issued, must perfect the same by fulfilling the conditions therein. These conditions include but are not limited to, the payment of a stand premium and ground rent within prescribed timelines. But even after the perfection of an allotment letter through the fulfillment of the conditions stipulated therein, an allottee cannot pass valid title to a third party unless and until he acquires title to the land through registration under the applicable law. It is the act of registration that confers a transferable title to the registered proprietor, and not the possession of an allotment letter….
We must reiterate the fact that an allotment letter in and by itself, is incapable of conferring a transferable title to an allottee. Put differently, the holder of an allotment letter is incapable of transferring or passing valid title to a third party on the basis of the allotment letter unless and until he becomes the registered proprietor of the land consequent upon the perfection of the Allotment Letter. It matters not therefore that the allotment letter has not lapsed.”
34. Also, in Gladys Wanjiru Ngacha v Teresa Chepsaat & 4 others HC Civil Case No 182 of 1992; [2008] eKLR, the superior court enunciated this point as follows:
“It has been held severally that a letter of allotment per se is nothing but an invitation to treat. It does not constitute a contract between the offerer and the offeree and does not confer an interest in land at all.”
35. The Plaintiff herein produced a allotment letter and payment receipts as evidence of compliance and nothing more. He did not produce an application for allotment, the acceptance of the said allocation, the further evidence of fulfillment of the conditions of allotment, the evidence of the land being surveyed, and the perfection of the allotment by acquisition of a Certificate of Lease. Also, there was no Part Development Plan (PDP) attached to or accompanying the said letter of allotment. It is trite law and procedure that an allotment letter should be accompanied by a part development plan under the legal regime the party claimed to have been allocated the land. This was a requirement under the then governing framework of the Government Lands Act (Cap. 280) (repealed). This paucity of evidence in support of the allocation gravely and fundamentally vitiated the Plaintiff’s claim to the plot in issue as owner. He cannot support any good proposition that the land belonged to him or that he was the proprietor of the land.
36. In Mako Abdi Doi-al v Ali Duane & 2 others [2019] eKLR, the Court emphasized that without a PDP, allotment is incomplete and any alienation of public land is void. Furthermore, in the case of African Line Transport Co. Ltd  Vs  The Hon .AG,  Mombasa HCCC No.276 of 2013 it was held as follows:
““Secondly, all the defence witnesses were unanimous that in the normal course of events, planning comes first, then surveying follows.  A letter of allotment is invariably accompanied by a PDP with a definite number. These are then taken to the department of survey, who undertake the surveying.  Once the surveying is complete, it is then referred to the Director of Surveys for authentication and approval. Thereafter, a land reference number is issued in respect of the plot.”
37. Further, the Plaintiff ought to have proven the legality of his title to the plot by producing evidence that would establish a clean root to it. Absent of that his document hang in the air and it not being air itself had to tumble through the ‘gravity’ of fundamental defect to the ground. In Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (Petition 8 (E010) of 2021) [2023] KESC 30 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (21 April 2023) (Judgment) the Supreme Court held,
“Where the registered proprietor’s root title was under challenge, it was not enough to dangle the instrument of title as proof of ownership. It was the instrument that was in challenge and therefore the registered proprietor must go beyond the instrument and prove the legality of the title and show that the acquisition was legal, formal and free from any encumbrance including interests which would not be noted in the register.”
38. Furthermore, although the burden lay on the Plaintiff to prove his case, the Defendants went beyond sitting pretty and waiting for that burden to be discharged. They rebutted the Plaintiff’s claim by asserting that the suit land was designated as a recreational park under the Lodwar Integrated Strategic Urban Development Plan (ISUDP) 2011–2030, which was adopted by the County Assembly in 2015. They supported this claim with geospatial and cadastral data as summarized elsewhere in this judgment.
39. Although the Plaintiff challenged the admissibility and accuracy of this technical evidence, he did not successfully dislodge the assertion that the land formed part of public land. Further, Article 62(1)(a) and (2) of the Constitution provides that public land shall vest in and be held by the County Government in trust for the people, and that any allocation thereof must involve the National Land Commission (NLC). There is no evidence that NLC approved or participated in the Plaintiff’s allotment. As held in Nelson Kazungu Chai & 9 others v Pwani University [2014] eKLR, the alienation of public land without such involvement is unconstitutional. The court went ahead to state:
“Where land has been reserved for public purpose, like in this case, any allocation of such land to private persons cannot be recognised by the court.  Public interest in land will always outweigh an individual's right to own the same property.  It therefore does not matter that the Plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation to be allocated the suit property”.
40. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a valid legal interest in Plot No. 817. His suit must fail on that account. Even then, the Court asked itself further questions.
b) Whether the demolition of the Plaintiff’s premises on 29th November 2018 was illegal or malicious
41. The Plaintiff alleged that the demolition occurred despite subsisting injunctive orders in Lodwar PMCC No. 7 of 2015. However, the Defendants contend that the said suit was withdrawn and no enforceable order existed at the time of demolition. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff did not produce a certified copy of the court order alleged to be in force as at 29th November 2018. As repeated often, under Section 107 of the Evidence Act, he who alleges must prove the allegation unless the law specifically lifts that burden and lays it on another. This the Plaintiff did not do.
42. The Plaintiff further failed to demonstrate that the demolition occurred without notice or due process. On the contrary, the Defendant produced DExh 6 to show that the Plaintiff was given notice which he failed to honour. He was supposed to demolish the development on the suit parcel at his own cost. He failed to do so.
43. In Mitubell Welfare Society v AG & 2 others [2021] KECA 88 (KLR), the Supreme Court underscored that demolition of informal or private settlements requires meaningful notice, engagement, and observance of due process. However, where the property is illegally acquired or situated on public land, the right to protection of property does not arise.
44. Given the Court’s earlier finding that the Plaintiff did not acquire legal ownership of the plot, and that the land was designated as a public recreation space, the demolition while unfortunate cannot be said to have been unlawful or malicious in the constitutional sense. Unfortunately, to protect an illegal invasion and occupation of public land or even private law which does not confer good title or rights over and above the owners would embolden trespassers and squatters invading people’s or public land and making unfounded torturous claims thereto to thrive. The demolition was carried out within the law. It was neither malicious nor illegal.
c) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to reliefs sought
45. Having found that the Plaintiff was not the legal proprietor of the suit land and also that the demolition was not malicious, the Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for compensatory damages or loss of rental income. The valuation report tendered by M/s Tuliflocks Ltd was based on the Plaintiff’s own assertions regarding rental income and development value. The Plaintiff claimed the value of the premises destroyed, the lost income in terms of rent and damages. First, regarding the loss of income as stipulated and calculated, the Plaintiff relied on a number of documents, including bank statements and tenancy agreements. Specifically, they were PEXH 8–23 which consisted a survey plan, photographs, tenancy agreements, bank statements, deposit slips, a valuation report dated 23rd August 2017, and additional documents marked. While the said documents would constitute evidence of some money reflected as income and expenditure, there is no evidence that the sums deposited in the bank was entirely from the business. Further, since the Plaintiff used the documents to demonstrate some earnings, there was were no accounts in form of statements of account and income or Kenya Revenue Authority tax returns to show that indeed the sums were earned as claimed and for the business he alleges he used to carry out.
46. Be that as it may it is clear that the suit land belonged to someone else other than the one who traded on it. He, thus, traded illegally on it and cannot be compensated for an illegality. If anything it him who should compensate the true owner who in this case is the County Government of Turkana.
47. As held in Kenya Hotel Properties Ltd v Willesden Investments Ltd [2009] eKLR, damages for wrongful demolition can only be awarded if the Plaintiff proves both title and wrongful interference.
48. Regarding the prayer for aggravated or exemplary damages, such relief is reserved for cases involving high-handed, oppressive, or unconstitutional conduct by State actors. In light of the absence of title and the Defendants’ constitutional mandate to protect public land under Article 62, the threshold for such damages has not been met.
d) Whether the suit is time-barred
49. The Defendants argue that the suit was time-barred under Section 3(1) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act (Cap. 39), which requires that suits against public authorities be filed within 12 months of the cause of action. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the wrongful act constituted a continuing trespass.
50. The Court finds that the alleged act demolition of the structure was a discrete event which occurred on 29th November 2018. The Defendants never moved in to occupy the suit premises. Thus, their acts were not continuous for some time. The claim, filed in December 2019, was filed over 12 months later. The doctrine of continuing trespass does not apply to acts of destruction and nonoccupation. In Gathoni v Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd [1982] KLR 104, the Court stated that limitation provisions must be strictly applied in claims against public authorities.
51. Accordingly, the suit was filed out of time and was actually statute-barred.
e) Whether the Defendants’ counterclaim for mesne profits is merited
52. The Defendants have claimed mesne profits for the Plaintiff’s alleged unlawful occupation of public land. However, they did not tender documentary or expert evidence quantifying the profits or showing the period of occupation and the income generated. In Attorney General v Halal Meat Products Ltd [2016] eKLR, the Court held that mesne profits must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Indeed, there is evidence that the Plaintiff occupied and the suit land to the exclusion of the Defendants. However, as long as the Defendant’s Counterclaim was for such specific claims which ought to be specifically proven their claim must fail. Thus, given the absence of concrete evidence on this limb, the counterclaim for mesne profits must fail.
FINAL DETERMINATION
53. Having regard to the foregoing analysis, the Court makes the following findings:
a) The Plaintiff did not establish legal and valid proprietary interest in Plot No. 817 in Lodwar Town;
b) The demolition of the structure on the suit property was neither unlawful nor malicious in law;
c) The Plaintiff’s suit was time-barred under Section 3(1) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act.
d) The Plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought, including compensation, loss of income, or damages;
e) The Defendants’ counterclaim for mesne profits is not proven hence not merited and is hereby dismissed.
FINAL ORDERS
54.  Consequently, this Court orders that:
a) The Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed in its entirety.
b) The Defendants’ counterclaim is equally dismissed.
c) The Plaintiff shall bear the costs of the suit. There shall be no order as to the costs of the Counterclaim.
55. Orders accordingly.
Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via the Teams Platform this 31st day of July 2025.
Hon. Dr. iur Nyagaka
Judge
Between 9:35 AM and 9:56 AM, in the presence of,
Musungu Advocate for the Plaintiff
Kisaka Advocate for the Defendants